

Siphoned apart: A portfolio perspective on order flow segmentation[☆]Markus Baldauf^{a,*}, Joshua Mollner^b, Bart Zhou Yueshen^c^a University of British Columbia, Sauder School of Business, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2, Canada^b Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, 2211 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL, 60657, USA^c Singapore Management University, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, 50 Stamford Road, Singapore, 178899, Singapore

ARTICLE INFO

JEL classification:

D47
G12
G18
G24

Keywords:

Order flow segmentation
Payment for order flow
Inventory management
Market making
Retail trading

ABSTRACT

We study liquidity supply in fragmented markets. Market makers intermediate heterogeneous order flows, trading off spread revenue against inventory costs. Applying our model to payment for order flow (PFOF), we demonstrate that portfolio-based considerations of inventory management incentivize market makers to segment retail orders by siphoning them off-exchange. Banning order flow segmentation reduces total welfare, can make trading more costly for all investors, and can resolve a prisoner's dilemma among market makers. These results differentiate our inventory-based model from the existing information-based theories of PFOF.

1. Introduction

Trade in modern financial markets is spread across many venues. Creation of the National Market System in the U.S. in 1975 marked the start of a sustained regulatory effort to create a reliable, integrated exchange trading environment. Yet, an enormous amount of trading still happens off-exchange—in recent months, nearly half of all equity volume. In part, this reflects differences in intermediation costs: investors who tend to be less costly for market makers to intermediate can be offered better prices if they are segmented into separate venues. But what does this order flow segmentation imply for welfare and liquidity? This

paper argues that the implications may be nuanced and may depend on *why* certain investors are less costly to intermediate than others.

There are two reasons for why investors may differ in their intermediation costs, each relating to one of the two classic frictions in the market microstructure literature: asymmetric information (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985) and inventory costs (Stoll, 1978; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho and Stoll, 1981, 1983). On the one hand, certain orders may be less costly to intermediate because they are less informed about fundamentals. And several existing studies have analyzed order flow segmentation through this lens. What has so far received less attention in the literature—despite its empirical importance—is the

[☆] Nikolai Roussanov was the editor for this article. This paper benefits tremendously from helpful comments by Robert Battalio (discussant), Eric Budish, Isaías Chaves, Darrell Duffie, Naveen Gondhi, Zhiguo He, Shiyang Huang, Vincent van Kervel, Ralph Koijen, John Kuong, Katya Malinova (discussant), Robert McDonald, Maureen O'Hara, Christine Parlour (discussant), Ioanid Roşu (discussant), Gideon Saar, Alvaro Sandroni, John Shim, Konstantin Sokolov (discussant), Viktor Todorov, and the seminar and conference participants at AFA, INSEAD, KU Leuven, Maastricht University, Monash University, Nanyang Technological University, NFA, SAFE Market Microstructure Conference, Singapore Management University, Texas Finance Festival, and Tilburg University. We also appreciate greatly insightful conversations with industry participants. Markus Baldauf gratefully acknowledges support by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Insight Grant #435-2021-1142), and he would like to thank the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, where he was visiting when large parts of this paper were written. We have no competing financial interests.

other possibility: that certain orders may be less costly to intermediate because they tend to be less correlated in direction with the other orders in a market maker's portfolio.¹ This paper aims to fill that gap. The analysis introduces a portfolio perspective on order flow management, which underlies an inventory-based incentive to segment orders. We obtain additional predictions regarding liquidity and welfare. We also discuss implications for the potential consequences of regulatory intervention.

We first study a baseline model in Section 2, where order flow segmentation is taken as given: order flows from various sources (e.g., retail investors or institutions) are exogenously split across marketplaces. These various marketplaces can represent exchanges, “upstairs” block trading, or many other forms of segmentation. Yet another form of order flow segmentation is payment for order flow (PFOF), a common order-handling practice in which retail orders are routed directly to market makers, who typically execute them against their own balance sheets. In Sections 3 and 4, we specialize the model to the setting of PFOF, where we show how considerations of inventory cost can cause this practice to arise endogenously.

Baseline model. A single asset is traded on a fixed number of marketplaces, where the volume of liquidity-demanding orders arriving to each marketplace is price-elastic (i.e., elastic with respect to the bid-ask spread). A key characteristic of a marketplace is its order flow directionality, which determines the probability with which each order arriving there is a buy or a sell. These directionalities are modeled as random variables with an arbitrary joint distribution, and they capture order correlation within and across marketplaces. Such correlation can arise, for example, from the splitting of large institutional parent orders into child orders or from sentiment-driven trading by retail investors. A continuum of market makers choose liquidity supplies—the expected numbers of orders that they will receive in each marketplace—balancing expected revenues from bid-ask spreads against quadratic inventory costs. An equilibrium consists of liquidity supplies and spreads for each marketplace such that (i) each market maker's liquidity supplies are optimal given the spreads, and (ii) each spread clears liquidity demand and supply in its marketplace.

A key insight from the baseline model is that market makers must consider their liquidity-supply decisions across marketplaces as a *portfolio*: the correlation structure of directionalities determines the extent to which order flows will offset, hence the expected inventory cost of marginal orders. In fact, the market maker's problem is tightly connected to the optimization problem in standard portfolio theory. Our analysis highlights that portfolio considerations matter even for inventory management of a *single* asset.

The importance of inventory considerations in general—and of a portfolio perspective in particular—is consistent with recent empirical evidence. Daures-Lescourret and Moinas (2023) show that after a shock to her inventory from an execution on one venue, a market maker's liquidity supply on the same (opposite) side becomes less (more) aggressive on *all* venues. Barardehi et al. (2024) argue that market makers treat retail orders differently, depending on institutional liquidity demand imbalances. Portfolio-based inventory considerations also explain two other facts: (i) Eaton et al. (2022) find that outage-induced reductions in Robinhood retail activity improve on-exchange liquidity supply (while outages of other brokers harm liquidity), and (ii) Schwarz et al. (2023) experimentally document that Robinhood clients receive less price improvement than clients of other retail brokers (E*Trade, Fidelity, TD Ameritrade). An explanation for both findings is that Robinhood order flow tends to exacerbate inventory imbalances: compared with order flows from other retail brokerages, Robinhood orders are

more concentrated (Barber et al., 2022) and more correlated with past returns (Eaton et al., 2022).

Application to PFOF. Whereas order flow segmentation is exogenous in the baseline model, we next investigate how it might *endogenously* arise, for example, in the form of PFOF.² Section 3 considers a setting with two marketplaces, on-exchange and off-exchange, and two order sources, *R* and *I*, for retail and institutional. *I*-orders must clear on-exchange, but an endogenous fraction of *R*-orders may be siphoned off-exchange. This siphoning endogenously affects both the characteristics of on-exchange order flow and the correlation between on-exchange and off-exchange order directionalities—and in turn, equilibrium volumes and bid-ask spreads as well.

Depending on parameters, the equilibrium entails either (i) both *R*- and *I*-orders clearing on-exchange (i.e., a “no-siphoning” equilibrium) or (ii) all *R*-orders siphoned off-exchange, leaving only *I*-orders on-exchange (i.e., a “with-siphoning” equilibrium). To see how siphoning arises, conjecture an equilibrium in which all orders clear on-exchange. This implies a specific portfolio of *R*- and *I*-orders for market makers. A market maker might, however, benefit if she could alter the composition of *R*- and *I*-orders in her portfolio—due to differences in the orders' characteristics, like their arrival rates and directionalities. In particular, if it is beneficial to obtain more *R*-orders, they can be siphoned off-exchange with the promise of a slightly smaller spread. Doing so destroys the conjectured no-siphoning equilibrium, yielding a with-siphoning equilibrium instead.

We characterize the exact condition that separates the two regions of parameters. In words, the with-siphoning region is precisely where *R*-orders contribute less to inventory costs (at the margin) than *I*-orders do. For example, this happens when *R*-order flow tends to be sufficiently well balanced between buys and sells. In this case, market makers find *R*-orders more attractive and siphon them off-exchange as a result. We argue in Section 3.3 that the realistic parameter values lie in this with-siphoning region, which is consistent with the fact that “in the equity markets right now, if you place a [retail] market order, 90–95 percent do not go to the lit exchanges, do not go to Nasdaq or New York Stock Exchange; they go to wholesalers” (Gensler, 2022).

Most existing models of PFOF analyze it through the lens of asymmetric information, as in Easley et al. (1996) and Battalio and Holden (2001). These models view retail orders as less informed than institutional orders, meaning that they create less adverse selection and can therefore be cleared at a smaller spread if siphoned off-exchange. Our model proposes an entirely different mechanism: retail orders may contribute less to—and may even reduce—market makers' inventory risk. As we discuss below, this differing mechanism implies different predictions and different policy implications.

One set of predictions concerns the consequences of banning off-exchange retail trading (hereafter, a “segmentation ban”) on spreads, market maker profits, and total welfare. Our analysis adds to the ongoing policy debate regarding PFOF. While the practice is widely prevalent in the U.S., it would be affected by new rules that the SEC has recently proposed (SEC, 2022). In Europe, the issue remains contentious (Reuters, 2023).

When a segmentation ban has an effect (i.e., in the with-siphoning region of the parameter space), the model predicts that it harms *R*-investors, in the sense that it leads them to pay a larger spread. One might think such a ban would entail a countervailing benefit for *I*-investors—however, this is not necessarily so. Rather, for certain parameters, *I*-investors are also harmed. When segmentation is banned and *R*-investors face a larger spread, fewer *R*-investors opt to trade. If

¹ Indeed, the staff report of SEC (2021) states that “[retail] orders are more likely to be small, uncorrelated with one another, and thus ‘one and done’ (i.e., not the first in a series of orders intended to transact a large amount of stock), which also allows for a tighter spread.”

² In practice, PFOF may refer to either (i) the practice whereby retail orders are routed directly to market makers and executed off-exchange, or (ii) the payment transferred from market makers to retail brokers for such a purpose. In this paper, PFOF refers primarily to (i). We do not model the payment (ii) both for parsimony and because it tends to be very small (Schwarz et al., 2023).

R-orders are sufficiently effective for hedging *I*-orders, this leads market makers to anticipate ending with a larger net inventory imbalance, and they set a larger on-exchange spread to compensate. Moreover, there is reason to think that this is not only a theoretical possibility, but in fact the empirically-relevant case: Evidence from Jones et al. (2023) suggests that retail order imbalances negatively correlate with institutional imbalances, hence are effective for hedging against them.

These predictions reveal an interesting comparison with the existing information-based models of PFOF. These models posit that *R*-investors pay a smaller spread when siphoned off-exchange because they are less informed than *I*-investors (i.e., create less adverse selection). By pooling both investor types, a segmentation ban would lead to an intermediate spread, harming *R*-investors while unambiguously benefiting *I*-investors. In contrast, our theory makes a more nuanced prediction for *I*-investors. And although our theory makes the same prediction for *R*-investors, it is for an entirely different reason: not because their orders are less informed but rather because they contribute less inventory risk.

Turning to market maker profitability, the model reveals that PFOF can sometimes function as a prisoner's dilemma: although each market maker has a unilateral incentive to siphon *R*-orders off-exchange, their collective siphoning creates a pecuniary externality, which may lead them to be worse off in equilibrium than if the practice were banned. In this way, our theory rationalizes market makers' seeming ambivalence toward regulatory discussions of bans on PFOF (and the order flow segmentation that PFOF entails).³

A segmentation ban unambiguously reduces total welfare in our model. This is because, absent a segmentation ban, the equilibrium in fact leads to the welfare-maximizing quantities of *R*- and *I*-investor volume, essentially by the First Welfare Theorem. By constraining market makers' liquidity-supply decisions, a segmentation ban distorts outcomes and necessarily reduces welfare. This analysis identifies a novel channel through which regulatory restrictions on PFOF might harm welfare, via market makers' inventory considerations.

Related literature. Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, a theoretical literature has studied market fragmentation from various angles: investors' venue choices (Pagano, 1989, Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991, Babus and Parlato, 2022); competition among venue operators (Pagnotta and Philippon, 2018, Chao et al., 2019, Baldauf and Mollner, 2020, Cespa and Vives, 2022); information and price discovery (Ye and Zhu, 2020, Zhu, 2014); speed and latency arbitrage (Foucault and Menkveld, 2008; Kervel, 2015); and price impact (Chen and Duffie, 2021). In the work closest to ours, Daures-Lescourret and Moinas (2023), as we do, speak to liquidity supply across exogenously fragmented exchanges in a setting with inventory frictions. Different from their paper, our model highlights that such inventory concerns, in fact, endogenously incentivize market makers to siphon certain orders off-exchange.

Second, our application to PFOF contributes to the theoretical literature on the practice. Battalio and Holden (2001) argue that PFOF and internalization can arise when orders' verifiable characteristics are correlated with informedness. This is consistent with evidence from Easley et al. (1996), who estimate that orders on the main exchange (NYSE) are more likely to be informed than those diverted to the regional exchange (Cincinnati). More recently, Yang and Zhu (2020) show that "back-runners" like high-frequency trading firms may be willing to pay for retail flows because doing so enables them to learn about institutional flows, infer the information driving those flows, and earn subsequent trading profits. The above explanations share a common feature: they all analyze PFOF through information-based channels, like adverse se-

lection and learning. Our model departs from this focus on information, turning instead to inventory risk as the key friction.

Various other dimensions of PFOF have also been explored theoretically. Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1995) show that order flows migrate from exchange (NYSE) to off-exchange (non-NYSE) via PFOF when discrete ticks constrain market makers' price competition. Hagerty and McDonald (1996) analyze a broker's optimal portfolio of informed and uninformed clientele. Kandel and Marx (1999) explicitly study brokers' order-handling decisions: sending to the exchange (via Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System), selling to market makers via PFOF, or internalizing (vertical integration). Parlour and Rajan (2003) argue that PFOF can serve as an anticompetitive device, raising market maker profits. Glode and Opp (2016) argue that pre-trading order flow agreements, like PFOF, can sustain intermediation chains that reduce information asymmetry and improve efficiency.

On the empirical side, our model connects to the recent, growing literature studying new developments in retail trading. Jain et al. (2023) document how the rise of zero-commission retail brokers changed various volume shares, for example, across brokers or between exchanges and wholesale market makers. Adams and Kasten (2021) study the execution quality of small orders in the zero-commission regime. Ernst and Spatt (2022) find that retail brokers receive larger PFOF payments in options than equities, meaning that they have an incentive to sway retail investors to the options market.

Our model also relates to the economics literature on price discrimination in competitive environments, surveyed by Stole (2007). One interesting feature of our model is that it is possible for price discrimination to lower spreads for all investors. This cannot happen in the classic model of third-degree oligopolistic price discrimination of Holmes (1989), which features two firms and two consumer groups (the "weak" and "strong" markets). However, Corts (1998) demonstrates that if the competing firms differ in which markets they consider strong versus weak, then it is possible for price discrimination to lower prices in both markets, a phenomenon he calls "all-out competition."

2. A model of liquidity supply

2.1. Setup

Overview. A single asset is traded on multiple marketplaces. Its fair value—the common component of its value—is constant and known to all. Liquidity-taking orders arriving at these marketplaces are met by liquidity-supplying market makers, at bid-ask spreads that clear each market. We assume away information asymmetry so as to mute channels already analyzed by previous literature. That is, all liquidity-taking orders are submitted for non-fundamental, private-value reasons.

Marketplaces and order flows. Marketplaces are indexed $j \in \{1, \dots, J\}$. For simplicity, we model these marketplaces as clearing simultaneously, at a single point in time.⁴ Appendix C considers dynamics, showing that our main conclusions carry over to a two-period version of the model. For each marketplace j , let $s_j \geq 0$ be its half bid-ask spread, which will be determined endogenously in equilibrium.⁵ We write $\mathbf{s} := (s_1, \dots, s_J)^\top$. As a convention, bold letters denote vectors (always columns) or matrices. A continuum of liquidity-demanding orders with measure $\lambda_j(s_j)$ arrives at marketplace j , with $\lambda_j(\cdot)$ decreasing and nonnegative.

⁴ An alternative but equivalent way to think about our model is that trading occurs over a continuous interval, with prices held fixed over that interval. Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) adopt a similar approach.

⁵ Because our primary focus will be on symmetric settings, in which order directionality is not predictable ex ante and market makers have zero initial inventory, each marketplace's midpoint (if we were to endogenize it) would be naturally at the fair value of the asset, leaving only the spread to be determined. This is why our analysis can focus only on the spreads.

³ For example, Ken Griffin (CEO of Citadel) has said, "Payment for order flow is a cost to me. So if you're going to tell me that by regulatory fiat one of my major items of expense disappears, I'm OK with that" (Financial Times, 2021).

Remark 1. For example, a model of PFOF might entail $J = 2$ marketplaces, with one as the exchange and the other as off-exchange execution on market makers' own balance sheets. In general, a marketplace can represent any trading venue where prices are determined by market clearing—including limit order books, periodic auctions, exchanges' retail liquidity programs, and the market for block trading. On the other hand, the marketplaces of our model are less appropriate for capturing venues where prices are determined in other ways—including midpoint dark pools and workup sessions.

Order directions. Each order arriving on marketplace j is independently either a one-unit buy or a one-unit sell, with respective probabilities $\frac{1}{2}(1 + D_j)$ and $\frac{1}{2}(1 - D_j)$, where $D_j \in [-1, 1]$ captures the average direction of the marketplace's order flow. The vector of directionalities $\mathbf{D} := (D_1, D_2, \dots, D_J)^\top$ is random, with mean and variance denoted $\mu = \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{D}]$ and $\Sigma = \text{var}[\mathbf{D}]$, respectively. We assume Σ is positive-definite.

Remark 2. Directionalities capture the possibility of correlation among orders. In reality, orders may be correlated due to several mechanisms. One is trading on private information about fundamentals. Yet, given our focus on inventory frictions, our model better fits correlation driven by forces other than private information. For example, correlation can arise from the splitting of large institutional parent orders placed for non-informational reasons like portfolio rebalancing, portfolio transition, and fund flows. Several datapoints help quantify the importance of large, non-informational institutional trades. Index additions and deletions are a source of such trades, because they cause index funds and other investors to adjust their holdings for mechanical reasons, and they lead to a significant increase in trading volume (e.g., Harris and Gurel, 1986; Greenwood, 2005). In the data of Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016), an average portfolio transition accounts for 4.20% of corresponding stocks' daily trading volume, and this number increases to 16.23% for small stocks. Coval and Stafford (2007) find that flows out of (or into) mutual funds can result in severe uninformed fire selling (or purchasing), and such fund flows amount to as much as 13.9% (Israeli data, Ben-Rephael et al., 2011) or 19.19% (U.S. data, Ben-Rephael et al., 2012) of total trading volume in the market. Furthermore, non-informational correlation can also arise when retail investors coordinate on online platforms (e.g., "WallStreetBets" on Reddit) or herd on the same market sentiment.

Microfoundation. The downward-sloping liquidity demand $\lambda_j(\cdot)$ can be microfounded as follows. Assume that order flow on marketplace j originates from a continuum of investors with measure κ_j . Each investor submits a one-unit immediate-or-cancel (IOC) order with a limit price reflecting her private value for the asset—this order will be marketable only if the private value is extreme enough, exceeding the half spread s_j . Her private value is positive with probability $\frac{1}{2}(1 + D_j)$ (and negative otherwise) and its magnitude is drawn i.i.d. from c.d.f. $F_j(\cdot)$. We then obtain the decreasing aggregate liquidity demand $\lambda_j(s_j) := \kappa_j \cdot (1 - F_j(s_j))$.

Liquidity supply. A continuum of market makers, indexed $m \in [0, M]$, compete to provide liquidity on all J marketplaces.⁶ Before $\mathbf{D}$ realizes, each market maker m chooses her liquidity supply x_{mj} for each marketplace j , taking as given the half spreads s , to maximize her expected profit described below. The number of randomly-assigned orders that market maker m will receive on marketplace j is a Poisson-distributed random variable with expectation x_{mj} . We write $\mathbf{x}_m := (x_{m1}, \dots, x_{mJ})^\top$.

⁶ While in reality the market making sector is composed of a handful of large wholesale market makers (Citadel, Virtu, etc.), we model them as a continuum to simplify the analysis by ensuring price-taking behavior.

Remark 3. The interpretation of x_{mj} may depend on what marketplace j represents. For example, if j refers to an exchange, then x_{mj} can represent a market maker's posted limit orders. Alternatively, x_{mj} can reflect the "groundwork" that a market maker needs to lay before trading starts, like the allocation of computational power, bandwidth, and staffing, data subscription fees, regulatory and compliance costs, etc. If j refers to market makers' siphoning of retail orders, then x_{mj} can refer to market maker m 's negotiations with brokers over the terms at which retail orders will be processed. In each of these situations, the number of orders that a market maker would in practice receive is random, determined by how many liquidity-demanding investors happen to arrive over the relevant interval of time. This is why we model x_{mj} as determining a random (rather than deterministic) number of orders that market maker m receives from marketplace j . In fact, the Poisson distribution that we assume would be exactly correct if the market maker were to receive liquidity-demanding orders at a constant rate over a fixed time interval. By letting market makers choose liquidity supplies $\mathbf{x}_m$, we effectively base our model of liquidity supply on quantity competition rather than price competition. Empirical evidence, e.g., from Brogaard and Garriott (2019), supports such a view.

Market maker profits. A market maker's profit has two components: spread revenue and inventory cost.⁷ Let Q_{mj} and Z_{mj} denote, respectively, market maker m 's realized volume and realized net inventory from supplying liquidity to marketplace j . For example, 2 buy and 3 sell orders would yield volume $Q_{mj} = 2 + 3$ and net inventory $Z_{mj} = -2 + 3$. Each unit of volume earns her the half-spread s_j . We assume the inventory cost is quadratic, with $\gamma > 0$ as a common scaling parameter. Ex ante both Q_{mj} and Z_{mj} are random, with distributions depending on her liquidity supply x_{mj} . Therefore, her expected profit

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{j=1}^J Q_{mj} s_j - \frac{\gamma}{2} \left(\sum_{j=1}^J Z_{mj} \right)^2 \right] \quad (1)$$

is an endogenous function of the liquidity supply choices $\mathbf{x}_m$.

Equilibrium definition. An equilibrium consists of liquidity supplies $\mathbf{x}_m$ for each market maker m and a half spread s_j for each marketplace j , such that (i) each market maker m 's $\mathbf{x}_m$ maximizes her expected profit (1), and (ii) market clearing holds for each marketplace j .⁸

$$\int_0^M x_{mj} dm = \lambda_j(s_j), \quad \forall j \in \{1, \dots, J\}. \quad (2)$$

2.2. Equilibrium characterization

We first express a market maker's expected profit (1) as a function of her liquidity supplies $\mathbf{x}_m$. Suppose she has chosen x_{mj} , meaning that her volume Q_{mj} is Poisson distributed with mean x_{mj} . She therefore expects spread revenue of $\mathbb{E}[Q_{mj} s_j] = x_{mj} s_j$ from marketplace j . Her net inventory from marketplace j can be written

$$Z_{mj} = \sum_{i=1}^{Q_{mj}} (-1)^{B_{imj}}, \quad (3)$$

⁷ Market makers' inventory costs can arise from risk aversion, price impact in portfolio rebalancing, capital pledged to clearing houses, or a moral hazard problem between market makers and their financiers (Bruche and Kuong, 2021).

⁸ In formulating this market-clearing condition, we follow convention in assuming an exact law of large numbers over a continuum of independent random variables. See Duffie et al. (2023) for a rigorous formulation.

where (B_{mj}) are i.i.d. Bernoulli draws with success rate $\frac{1}{2}(1 + D_j)$. Total net inventory across all marketplaces is $\sum_{j=1}^J Z_{mj}$, where, to evaluate her quadratic inventory cost, we need the expectation of its square.

Lemma 1. A market maker m 's expected squared inventory is

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\left(\sum_{j=1}^J Z_{mj} \right)^2 \right] = \mathbf{x}_m^\top \mathbf{1} + \mathbf{x}_m^\top (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top) \mathbf{x}_m,$$

where $\mathbf{1}$ is a length- J column vector of ones.

To understand Lemma 1, consider the special case with only one marketplace j and only sell orders (i.e., $\sigma_j = 0$ and $\mu_j = -1$). Because all orders are to sell, a market maker's realized inventory Z_{mj} equals her volume Q_{mj} , which is a Poisson random variable with mean x_{mj} . Hence, expected squared inventory is $\mathbb{E}[Z_{mj}^2] = \text{var}[Z_{mj}] + \mathbb{E}[Z_{mj}]^2 = x_{mj} + x_{mj}^2$, consistent with Lemma 1. For general values of σ_j and μ_j , we derive in the proof that $\mathbb{E}[Z_{mj}^2] = x_{mj} + (\sigma_j^2 + \mu_j^2)x_{mj}^2$. Intuitively, potential for both buying and selling, on the one hand, allows certain offsetting in the net inventory Z_{mj} , thus lowering the x_{mj}^2 term to $x_{mj}^2\mu_j^2$; but on the other hand, randomness in the composition of buys versus sells creates additional variation, thus adding the term $x_{mj}^2\sigma_j^2$. With multiple marketplaces, the expectation of the square of total inventory is as stated in Lemma 1.

Using Lemma 1, therefore, we can write the market maker's optimization problem as⁹

$$\max_{\mathbf{x}_m} \mathbf{x}_m^\top \left(s - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{1} \right) - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{x}_m^\top (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top) \mathbf{x}_m. \quad (4)$$

Because the optimization problem (4) is quadratic, first-order conditions yield the market maker's optimal liquidity supplies

$$\mathbf{x}_m = \frac{1}{\gamma} (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top)^{-1} \left(s - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{1} \right). \quad (5)$$

The equilibrium half spreads s can then be pinned down via the market-clearing condition (2).

Proposition 1 (Equilibrium liquidity supply). *There exists a unique equilibrium, where the half spreads s are the unique solution of $\frac{M}{\gamma} (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top)^{-1} \left(s - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{1} \right) = (\lambda_1(s_1), \dots, \lambda_J(s_J))^\top$; and where each market maker m 's liquidity supply $\mathbf{x}_m$ is given by (5), which moreover satisfies $\mathbf{x}_m \geq 0$.*

2.3. Connections to portfolio theory

The objective (4) resembles the optimization problem in standard portfolio theory:

$$\max_{\mathbf{w}} \mathbf{w}^\top (\mathbf{r} - r_f \mathbf{1}) - \frac{a}{2} \mathbf{w}^\top \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_r \mathbf{w},$$

where, fixing the risk-free rate r_f , an investor with risk-aversion coefficient a chooses a weight vector $\mathbf{w}$ over risky assets with expected returns $\mathbf{r}$ and variances $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_r$. Analogously, our market makers choose liquidity-supply portfolios $\mathbf{x}_m$ for a single asset.

The solution to this standard portfolio problem is $\mathbf{w}^* = \frac{1}{a} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_r^{-1} (\mathbf{r} - r_f \mathbf{1})$. Naturally, our expression for the optimal supply (5) resembles it. Portfolio theory, therefore, also suggests an intuition for equation (5). In choosing her optimal portfolio, an investor trades off

⁹ We do not require the liquidity supplies $\mathbf{x}_m$ to be nonnegative, although they always are in the unique equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1. For example, $x_{mj} < 0$ might be interpreted as the market maker demanding liquidity on marketplace j by crossing the spread.

the benefit from the assets' expected returns $\mathbf{w}^\top \mathbf{r}$ against two sources of cost: (i) the opportunity cost of not investing in the risk-free asset $\mathbf{w}^\top r_f \mathbf{1}$ and (ii) the portfolio's return risk $\frac{a}{2} \mathbf{w}^\top \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_r \mathbf{w}$. In optimizing her portfolio, the investor maximizes the Sharpe ratio $\frac{\mathbf{w}^\top (\mathbf{r} - r_f \mathbf{1})}{\sqrt{\mathbf{w}^\top \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_r \mathbf{w}}}$ then scales according to her risk aversion a . In our setup, a market maker trades off the benefit from the spread revenues $\mathbf{x}_m^\top s$ against the expected inventory cost $\mathbf{x}_m^\top \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{1} + \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{x}_m^\top (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top) \mathbf{x}_m$ (see Lemma 1). To obtain her optimal liquidity supply (5), a market maker maximizes a similar ratio $\frac{\mathbf{x}_m^\top (s - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{1})}{\sqrt{\mathbf{x}_m^\top (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top) \mathbf{x}_m}}$ then scales according to the inventory cost parameter γ .

As another connection, our equilibrium half spreads s are determined via market clearing (as in (2)), similar to how equilibrium expected returns $\mathbf{r}$ are determined in, e.g., CAPM. One key difference is that, in our model, market makers face spread-elastic liquidity demand ($\lambda_j(\cdot)$ is downward-sloping), while in CAPM, the assets are in inelastic fixed supplies. This is because whereas every agent in CAPM faces a portfolio problem, in our model, only the liquidity-supplying market makers do (the liquidity-demanding investors do not).¹⁰

3. Endogenous order flow segmentation

We next adapt our general model of liquidity supply to the setting of PFOF, highlighting how the economic forces that we model can cause order flow segmentation to arise endogenously.

3.1. Setup

To capture PFOF, we model two types of investors: institutional and retail. In particular, retail orders can be executed either on-exchange or off-exchange (albeit at a spread no worse than that on-exchange). This corresponds to a version of the model described in Section 2.1 with $J = 2$ marketplaces whose order flows are an *endogenous* mixture of retail and institutional orders.

Investors and their liquidity demand. The two types of liquidity-demanding investors are labeled $k \in \{R, I\}$. The measure of type- k orders is $\lambda_k(s)$, where for tractability we assume

$$\lambda_k(s) = \max\{0, (\zeta - s)\omega_k\},$$

where $\omega_k > 0$ measures the magnitude of the type- k demand, and $\zeta > 0$ reflects the maximum acceptable trading cost—demand falls to zero if the half-spread s exceeds ζ . We also assume $\zeta > \frac{\gamma}{2}$ to guarantee trading in equilibrium.¹¹

As before, we assume every order from a type- k investor is independently either a one-unit buy or a one-unit sell, with respective probabilities $\frac{1}{2}(1 + D_k)$ and $\frac{1}{2}(1 - D_k)$, where $D_k \in [-1, 1]$ captures the average direction of type- k orders. For simplicity, we let $\mathbb{E}[D_I] = \mathbb{E}[D_R] = 0$.¹² We write $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_o = \text{var}[(D_I, D_R)^\top] = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_I^2 & \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \\ \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R & \sigma_R^2 \end{pmatrix}$ and assume that $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_o$ is positive-definite.

¹⁰ Another distinction applies to the version of the model that we subsequently consider in Sections 3–4. There, market makers are allowed to endogenously siphon order flows, which endogenizes the demand $\lambda_j(\cdot)$ in each marketplace, as well as the corresponding directionality characteristics $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ and $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$.

¹¹ Indeed, (i) liquidity demand vanishes on all marketplaces j where $s_j > \zeta$; (ii) hence, market clearing requires zero liquidity supply ($x_{mj} = 0$) for such marketplaces and nonnegative liquidity supply ($x_{mj} \geq 0$) elsewhere; (iii) if $\zeta \leq \frac{\gamma}{2}$, then we have $s_j \leq \frac{\gamma}{2}$ for these other marketplaces; (iv) hence, according to (4), any such $\mathbf{x}_m \neq \mathbf{0}$ leads to negative profit, so that market makers optimally choose $\mathbf{x}_m = \mathbf{0}$.

¹² Setting $\mathbb{E}[D_I] = \mathbb{E}[D_R] = 0$ is with little loss of generality: as seen from Section 2.2 and Proposition 1, the mean vector $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ enters the analysis only via the matrix $\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top$, so that its effects can be equivalently attributed to $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$.

Remark 4. The linear demand can be microfounded, following the discussion on p. 4, by assuming that the investors' private value magnitudes are uniformly distributed on $[0, \zeta]$. Setting the same ζ for both $k \in \{R, I\}$ amounts to assuming that each investor type exhibits the same price elasticity, $\frac{d\lambda_k/\lambda_k}{ds/s} = -\frac{s}{\zeta-s}$, which is a natural benchmark case.

Marketplaces and routing. Aside from differences in the parameters (ω_R, σ_R) and (ω_I, σ_I) , the other difference between the two investor types is that R -investors' orders can be siphoned off-exchange, while I -investors' orders must remain on-exchange.¹³ Formally, we define $J = 2$ marketplaces, labeled as 1 and 2, where 1 refers to on-exchange and 2 to off-exchange execution of retail orders. All I -orders are routed to marketplace 1. For R -orders, an endogenous fraction $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ are routed to marketplace 2, and the remaining $1 - \alpha$ to marketplace 1. The measure of liquidity-demanding orders on each of the two marketplaces is therefore

$$\lambda_1(s_1) = \lambda_I(s_1) + (1 - \alpha)\lambda_R(s_1) \text{ and } \lambda_2(s_2) = \alpha\lambda_R(s_2).$$

Order flow on marketplace 1 is a mixture of I -orders with weight ω_I and R -orders with weight $(1 - \alpha)\omega_R$. Order flow on marketplace 2 is purely type- R . Letting the weighting matrix be

$$F(\alpha) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\omega_I}{\omega_I + (1 - \alpha)\omega_R} & \frac{(1 - \alpha)\omega_R}{\omega_I + (1 - \alpha)\omega_R} \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad (6)$$

the order flow directionality vector $(D_1, D_2)^\top = F(\alpha)(D_I, D_R)^\top$ is a function of α and therefore endogenous. We also compute $\Sigma = \text{var}[(D_1, D_2)^\top] = F(\alpha)\Sigma_o F(\alpha)^\top$.

Liquidity supply. Market makers, their liquidity supplies, and their objective functions are modeled precisely as in Section 2.1.

Equilibrium definition. An equilibrium consists of liquidity supplies (x_{m1}, x_{m2}) for each market maker m , the fraction $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ of R -orders that are siphoned off-exchange, and half spreads s_1 and s_2 , such that (i) each market maker m 's (x_{m1}, x_{m2}) maximizes her expected profit (1), (ii) market clearing holds for each marketplace j , which, following (2) can be written

$$\int_0^M x_{m1} dm = (\zeta - s_1)(\omega_I + (1 - \alpha)\omega_R) \text{ and } \int_0^M x_{m2} dm = (\zeta - s_2)\alpha\omega_R,$$

and (iii) the spreads satisfy both of the following conditions:

$$s_1 \leq s_2 \text{ if } \alpha < 1; \quad (7a)$$

$$s_1 \geq s_2 \text{ if } \alpha > 0. \quad (7b)$$

Conditions (7a) and (7b) represent the fiduciary duty of (unmodeled) retail brokers to their clients. For example, they together imply that if $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, then $s_1 = s_2$. The intuition is that $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ means R -orders are routed both off- and on-exchange. This mixing behavior conforms with best-execution obligations only if both outlets offer identical execution quality, in the sense that $s_1 = s_2$. Similarly, if $\alpha = 1$ ($\alpha = 0$), so that all R -orders are routed off-exchange (on-exchange), then $s_1 \geq s_2$ ($s_1 \leq s_2$).¹⁴

¹³ Not modeled are off-exchange venues that cater to I -investors. For example, many dark pools cross institutional buy and sell orders at the midpoint. Appendix B extends our model by introducing a midpoint dark pool accessible to I -investors. Our results are robust to this extension.

¹⁴ The access rule of Reg NMS (Rule 610) prohibits exchanges from differential treatment of orders based on the identity of the trader. Our model captures

Remark 5. In practice, when executing retail orders off-exchange, market makers typically charge a spread lower than the one prevailing on-exchange. The difference is called *price improvement*, which endogenously arises in our model whenever $s_1 - s_2 > 0$. Furthermore, when a retail order is siphoned off-exchange in practice, the retail investor's broker may receive an additional payment, known as *payment for order flow*, from the market maker who handles the order. Schwarz et al. (2023) show that this payment is small, ranging "from \$0.001 to \$0.03 per share [...] an order of magnitude smaller than [...] price improvement, which ranges from \$0.03 to \$0.08." Nor is it central to the economic mechanism we analyze. We therefore opt to simplify the model by omitting brokers and ignoring payments they would receive.

3.2. The incentive to siphon retail orders off-exchange

Before characterizing equilibrium, we pause to examine market makers' incentives to siphon retail orders off-exchange in our model. To do so, we conjecture an equilibrium in which all R -orders are routed on-exchange (i.e., $\alpha = 0$), and we seek conditions under which such a no-siphoning equilibrium exists.

With $J = 2$ marketplaces, a market maker's expected profit (1) can in general be written

$$\pi_m = \left(s_1 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right)x_{m1} + \left(s_2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right)x_{m2} - \frac{\gamma}{2}(\sigma_1^2 x_{m1}^2 + 2r\sigma_1\sigma_2 x_{m1}x_{m2} + \sigma_2^2 x_{m2}^2), \quad (8)$$

where σ_1^2 and σ_2^2 are the diagonal elements of Σ and $r\sigma_1\sigma_2$ is the off-diagonal covariance, with $r \in [-1, 1]$ as the correlation. Note that both σ_1 and r are functions of α via the weighting matrix $F(\alpha)$, whereas $\sigma_2 = \sigma_R$ regardless of α (as marketplace 2 contains only R -orders). Below, we write $\sigma_1(\alpha)$ and $r(\alpha)$ to emphasize this dependence.

Suppose we are in an equilibrium with $\alpha = 0$. Market clearing therefore requires that $x_{m2} = 0$. Because the assumption $\zeta > \frac{\gamma}{2}$ rules out a no-trade equilibrium (cf. Footnote 11), we therefore have $x_{m1} > 0$. To sustain the conjectured equilibrium, the profit from a marginal unit of x_{m2} must be weakly negative:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_m}{\partial x_{m2}} \Big|_{x_{m2}=0} = \left(s_2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right) - \gamma r(0)\sigma_1(0)\sigma_R x_{m1} \leq 0; \quad (9)$$

and the first-order condition with respect to x_{m1} must hold:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_m}{\partial x_{m1}} \Big|_{x_{m2}=0} = \left(s_1 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right) - \gamma\sigma_1(0)^2 x_{m1} = 0. \quad (10)$$

Therefore, a no-siphoning equilibrium can obtain only if both (9) and (10) hold. Following (7a), $s_2 \geq s_1$, so that both can hold only if $\gamma r(0)\sigma_1(0)\sigma_R x_{m1} \geq \gamma\sigma_1(0)^2 x_{m1}$. Because γ , $\sigma_1(0)$, σ_R , and x_{m1} are all strictly positive, this requires $r(0) \geq \frac{\sigma_1(0)}{\sigma_R}$.¹⁵

Evaluating $r(0)$ and $\sigma_1(0)$ in terms of the primitive parameters, we find that $\text{sign}\left[r(0) - \frac{\sigma_1(0)}{\sigma_R}\right]$ matches the sign of the quantity

$$\Delta := (\sigma_R^2 \omega_R + \rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_I) - (\sigma_I^2 \omega_I + \rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_R), \quad (11)$$

which summarizes the differences between the two investor types that are relevant for siphoning decisions. To understand this expression, note

this through (7b): if $s_1 < s_2$, then all R -investors would prefer to trade on the exchange; by the access rule, they must be allowed to do so; we therefore obtain $\alpha = 0$. In contrast, off-exchange execution is *not* subject to the access rule, which is why I -investors trade on-exchange, even if $s_2 < s_1$.

¹⁵ This condition becomes less likely to hold if R -orders become more attractive: either by virtue of becoming relatively less likely to exhibit significant directionality (i.e., small σ_R relative to $\sigma_1(0)$) or by better diversifying inventory risk from on-exchange orders (i.e., small $r(0)$). When R -orders become so attractive that the condition fails, market makers have an incentive to siphon them off-exchange, destroying the putative no-siphoning equilibrium.

that the first bracketed term represents the covariance of the market maker's existing portfolio with a marginal R -order: σ_R^2 is the covariance with another R -order, $\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R$ is the covariance with an I -order, and these are respectively weighted by ω_R and ω_I . The second term is the analogue for a marginal I -order. If the difference Δ is negative, a marginal R -order amplifies inventory risk by less (or mitigates it by more) than a marginal I -order, so that market makers have incentive to siphon them.¹⁶ In fact, Δ is the key determinant of the equilibrium:

Proposition 2 (*The PFOF equilibrium*). *The three equilibrium objects—the liquidity supplies $(x_m)_{m \in [0, M]}$, the fraction α of off-exchange R -orders, and the half spreads s —are determined as follows.*

- (i) If $\Delta < 0$, then there is a unique equilibrium in which $\alpha = 1$.
- (ii) If $\Delta > 0$, then there is a unique equilibrium in which $\alpha = 0$.
- (iii) If $\Delta = 0$, then there is an equilibrium for any $\alpha \in [0, 1]$.

In all cases, $(x_m)_{m \in [0, M]}$ and s follow Proposition 1, with $\lambda_1(s) = \lambda_I(s) + (1 - \alpha)\lambda_R(s)$, $\lambda_2(s) = \alpha\lambda_R(s)$, $\mu = 0$, and $\Sigma = F(\alpha)\Sigma_0 F(\alpha)^\top$.

Surprisingly, the equilibrium fraction of off-exchange R -orders is a boundary value $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}$ (except when $\Delta = 0$). An intuition is the following. If $\Delta < 0$, then by previous analysis, each market maker wants to siphon at least some R -orders off-exchange. Once all market makers do this, however, on-exchange flow becomes more heavily composed of I -orders, so that each market maker can achieve her targeted mixture of R - and I -order flow only by siphoning even more R -orders off-exchange. This reinforcing logic repeats itself until all R -orders have been siphoned off-exchange in equilibrium.¹⁷

Depending on parameters, the equilibrium might not feature on-exchange trading. This can happen because of off-exchange trading: When $\Delta < 0$, market makers siphon R -orders off-exchange and take on the resulting inventories. If $\rho > 0$, this raises the marginal inventory cost of I -orders, potentially to the point at which it is no longer profitable for market makers to provide liquidity on-exchange. Equilibria without on-exchange trading are, of course, inconsistent with the current reality. The following proposition characterizes the parametric conditions that ensure both on- and off-exchange trading in equilibrium. Our subsequent analysis focuses on the case in which these conditions hold.

Proposition 3 (*Equilibrium with positive volume both on- and off-exchange*). *There is a unique equilibrium with both $\int_0^M x_{m1} dm > 0$ and $\int_0^M x_{m2} dm > 0$ if and only if both $\Delta < 0$ and*

$$M > (\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R - \sigma_R^2)\omega_R\gamma \quad (12)$$

hold.¹⁸

¹⁶ Conversely, if $\Delta > 0$, market makers would want to siphon I -orders—if they could—leaving only R -orders on the exchange.

¹⁷ Indeed when $\Delta < 0$, market makers always feel they have too few R -orders in the putative equilibrium corresponding to any $\alpha < 1$. To see this, note that by market clearing, the equilibrium weight of R -orders in market makers' portfolio of order flows can in general be written

$$\frac{(1 - \alpha)\lambda_R(s_1) + \alpha\lambda_R(s_2)}{\lambda_I(s_1) + (1 - \alpha)\lambda_R(s_1) + \alpha\lambda_R(s_2)}.$$

For all $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, the above remains constant at $\omega_R/(\omega_I + \omega_R)$, because $s_1 = s_2$ for $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ following (7a) and (7b) and because s_2 does not enter when $\alpha = 0$. Focusing on the case of $\alpha = 0$, the in-text analysis showed that if $\Delta < 0$, this exposure to R -orders is too low: market makers want to siphon R -orders to increase their exposure. We have just shown that any $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ leads to the same exposure, hence the same incentive to siphon further. As this discussion suggests, one model change that might lead to an interior equilibrium value for α would be if R - and I -investors exhibited different elasticities of demand (cf. Remark 4).

¹⁸ By Proposition 2, insisting on equilibrium uniqueness merely rules out the non-generic case of $\Delta = 0$. In this knife-edge case of $\Delta = 0$, there is an equi-

librium for each $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, all of which—with the exception of $\alpha = 0$ —entail $\int_0^M x_{m1} dm > 0$ and $\int_0^M x_{m2} dm > 0$ simultaneously holding.

3.3. Discussion of parameters

Reality features positive volume both on- and off-exchange. According to Proposition 3, this realistic outcome arises in the model when both $\Delta < 0$ and (12) hold. Thus, a test of the model is to see whether realistic parameter values are consistent with those conditions. This subsection argues that this is the case.

The fluctuation of order directionality, σ_R and σ_I . Order flow of either type, $k \in \{R, I\}$, can be viewed as a mixture of independent and coordinated trades, with the parameter σ_k capturing the composition of this mixture. For example, the extreme in which each k -order is independently either to buy or to sell (each with equal probability) is captured by $\sigma_k = 0$. And the extreme in which all k -orders are children of the same parent order (which is either to buy or to sell, each with equal probability) is captured by $\sigma_k = 1$. Consistent with $\sigma_R < \sigma_I$, independent trades empirically feature much more heavily in retail order flow. Indeed, the SEC report quoted in Footnote 1 makes exactly this point. Likewise, Ken Griffin (CEO of Citadel) said in his 2021 Congressional testimony:

the average retail order is much smaller in totality than the average order that goes onto an exchange [...] Because it's a small order, the amount of risk that we need to assume in managing that order is relatively small, as compared to an order that we have to manage from our on exchange trading. (Griffin, 2021)

Yet another economic force operates through midpoint dark pools, which allow institutional investors to first cross their buy and sell orders, so that only the remaining imbalance is subsequently passed along to the exchange, to be absorbed by market makers. Because order imbalance is necessarily more extremely directional than the original order flow, these dark pools effectively enlarge σ_I , and thereby make, all else equal, $\sigma_R < \sigma_I$ more likely. Appendix B provides a model extension that demonstrates this mechanism.

More direct evidence is available from Jones et al. (2023), who use comprehensive account-level data from the Chinese stock market to directly compute signed order imbalance measures for both retail and institutional investors at the daily level.¹⁹ According to Panel C of their Table I, order imbalances are more tightly clustered around zero for retail than for institutional, consistent with $\sigma_R < \sigma_I$. The standard deviation of imbalances is 0.455 for institutional accounts, and it ranges from 0.171 to 0.352 for retail, depending on account size.

The correlation of order directionality, ρ . The aforementioned evidence from Jones et al. (2023) also speaks to the correlation of signed order flow imbalances. According to Panel C of their Table I, retail and institutional imbalances are negatively correlated, consistent with $\rho < 0$.

¹⁹ It is difficult to perform a similar exercise using standard, nonproprietary datasets—like TAQ and Refinitiv—because they lack retail or institutional trade identifiers. It remains possible to imperfectly classify these trades, e.g., using the algorithm proposed by Boehmer et al. (2021). However, inexactness in this algorithm (Schwarz et al., 2023) could bias estimates.

The precise correlation ranges from -0.380 to -0.188 , depending on retail account size. This empirically-documented negative correlation can arise for many reasons.²⁰ For simplicity, we assume it is exogenous, yet we conjecture that the effects we study would also arise in a model where (negative) correlation arises endogenously. In fact, some other models go as far as assuming perfect negative correlation between shocks that drive retail and institutional trades, as in Hendershott et al. (2022). Similar assumptions are made by, e.g., Grossman and Miller (1988); Lo et al. (2004).

The magnitude of liquidity demand, ω_R and ω_I . Despite recent growth, retail trading remains small in comparison to institutional trading volumes. For example, Bloomberg (2022) reports that retail trading accounts for 17.5% of total trading volume in the second quarter of 2022, while non-bank buy-side institutions account for 34.8%. This suggests a ratio of $\omega_R/\omega_I \approx 1/2$.

Summary. Overall, the evidence suggests that $\sigma_R < \sigma_I$, $\rho < 0$, and $\omega_R < \omega_I$. These are sufficient to guarantee $\Delta < 0$ in our model, implying positive off-exchange volume (i.e., siphoning of R -orders) in equilibrium. Further, $\rho < 0$ is by itself sufficient for (12) to hold, implying also positive on-exchange volume. As such, our model yields realistic trading patterns under realistic parametrizations.

4. Predictions

Continuing the application to PFOF, we now explore the model's predictions. We study three equilibrium objects: bid-ask spreads in Section 4.1, market maker profitability in Section 4.2, and total welfare in Section 4.3. We also address policy debates over the off-exchange segmentation of retail orders. A ban on this practice (henceforth, a “segmentation ban”) would consolidate both R - and I -orders on the exchange (marketplace 1), yielding an equilibrium characterized by the following corollary.

Corollary 1 (Equilibrium under a segmentation ban). *Under an exogenous $\alpha = 0$, the equilibrium liquidity supplies $(x_m)_{m \in [0, M]}$ and the half spreads s follow Proposition 1, with $\lambda_I(s) = \lambda_I(s) + \lambda_R(s)$, $\lambda_2(s) = 0$, $\mu = 0$, and $\Sigma = F(0)\Sigma_0 F(0)^T$.*

For the analysis below, we denote the equilibrium objects under the ban with a subscript b . For example, under the ban, all trades happen on-exchange and there is only one spread, s_b .

A no-siphoning equilibrium ($\alpha = 0$) can endogenously arise under certain parameter values and, of course, a segmentation ban has no effect in this case. More interesting are parameter values leading to a with-siphoning equilibrium ($\alpha = 1$), meaning that a segmentation ban would bite. As discussed earlier, these parameter values are also more relevant. For our analysis in this section, we therefore specialize to the set of relevant parameters, for which equilibrium features positive volume both on- and off-exchange. Using the characterization of Proposition 3, we therefore maintain the following assumption:

²⁰ For example, Linnainmaa (2010) shows empirically that informed institutions adversely select retail investors, so that institutional trades and retail trades are, respectively, positively and negatively correlated with contemporaneous returns, hence negatively correlated with each other. In addition, retail and institutional investors may trade against each other for non-informational reasons: Kaniel et al. (2008) show that retail traders pursue contrarian trading strategies, whereby they profit from providing liquidity to institutions' temporary price impacts; reversely, I -investors may crawl online platforms so as to monitor and trade against R -investors' sentiment; finally, R -investors may coordinate via online platforms to trade against I -investors' bets, as in how they attempted to short squeeze institutions in GameStop and other “meme stocks” in early 2021.




Fig. 1. Bid-ask spreads: the effect of a segmentation ban. This figure shows how various (half) bid-ask spreads change when a segmentation ban is imposed. The order flow direction correlation ρ varies on the horizontal axis. The other parameters are set at $M = 3$, $\gamma = \zeta = 1$, $\omega_I = 100$, $\omega_R = 50$, $\sigma_I = 0.5$, $\sigma_R = 0.2$, and $\mu_I = \mu_R = 0$. In particular, $s_1 > s_b$ if and only if $\rho < -\frac{1}{2}$.

Assumption (Relevant parameter values). $\Delta < 0$ and condition (12) both hold.

4.1. Bid-ask spreads: trading costs

This subsection studies equilibrium spreads. Without a segmentation ban, we examine s_1 for the on-exchange, s_2 for the off-exchange, and $\bar{s}$ for the volume-weighted average half spread, defined as²¹

$$\bar{s} = \frac{\lambda_I(s_1)s_1 + \lambda_R(s_2)s_2}{\lambda_I(s_1) + \lambda_R(s_2)}, \quad (13)$$

as well as price improvement $s_1 - s_2$. With a segmentation ban, the spread is s_b .

4.1.1. Segmentation ban

We find that R -investors are unambiguously harmed by a segmentation ban, in the sense that it causes them to pay a larger spread ($s_b > s_2$). In contrast, I -investors often benefit from a segmentation ban—although not always. In particular, a segmentation ban harms not only R -investors but also I -investors if and only if ρ is sufficiently negative (in a way made precise by Proposition 4 and as illustrated by Fig. 1). Additionally, such a ban unambiguously causes the volume-weighted average spread to increase ($s_b > \bar{s}$).

Proposition 4 (Segmentation ban and spreads). $s_2 < s_b$ and $\bar{s} < s_b$. Moreover, $s_1 < s_b$ if and only if $\rho < -(M + \sigma_R^2 \omega_R \gamma) / (\sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_I)$.

Comparison with information-based theories of PFOF. We pause here to compare and contrast Proposition 4 with predictions from information-based theories of PFOF (e.g., Battalio and Holden, 2001). Under the natural assumption that R -orders are less informed than I -orders, those theories predict that R -investors would be harmed by a segmentation ban, while I -investors would benefit. Our model predicts the same for R -investors, but for an entirely different reason: R -investors pay a smaller spread when segmentation is allowed not because their orders are less informed but rather because their orders generate less inventory risk for market makers. In contrast to those theories, however, our

²¹ The volume weights for s_1 and s_2 in (13) are $\lambda_I(s_1)$ and $\lambda_R(s_2)$ respectively because, under the maintained assumption that $\Delta < 0$, without a segmentation ban all R -orders are siphoned off-exchange (i.e., $\alpha = 1$) in equilibrium, meaning that all I -investors pay s_1 and all R -investors s_2 .

model predicts that I -investors might also pay a smaller spread when segmentation is allowed.

Intuition for why $s_2 < s_b$. The intuition follows Proposition 2: Given the maintained assumption that $\Delta < 0$, R -investors are less costly for market makers to intermediate than I -investors. When segmentation is allowed, R -investors therefore pay a smaller spread. That is, $s_2 < s_1$, implying $s_2 < \bar{s}$. Combined with $\bar{s} < s_b$ (which we explain next), we therefore have $s_2 < s_b$.

Intuition for why $\bar{s} < s_b$. Let f_R denote the fraction of volume due to R -orders. When segmentation is banned, volume is proportional to demand magnitude, so that $f_R^{\text{ban}} = \frac{\omega_R}{\omega_R + \omega_I}$ in equilibrium. When segmentation is allowed, and given $\Delta < 0$, market makers siphon R -orders off-exchange, meaning that $f_R^{\text{no-ban}} > f_R^{\text{ban}}$. In either case, the volume-weighted average spread $\bar{s}$ is determined by the intersection of an average liquidity demand curve and an average liquidity supply curve:

Lemma 2 (Average liquidity demand and supply curves). *Investors' average liquidity demand and market makers' average liquidity supply curves are given, respectively, by*

$$\bar{s}(x; f_R) = \zeta - v(f_R)x \text{ and } \bar{s}(x; f_R) = \frac{\gamma}{2} + c(f_R)x,$$

where x is the aggregate volume, and $v(\cdot)$ and $c(\cdot)$ are the respective curves' slopes:

$$v(f_R) = \frac{(1 - f_R)^2}{\omega_I} + \frac{f_R^2}{\omega_R} \text{ and } c(f_R) = \frac{\gamma}{M} \text{var}[(1 - f_R)D_I + f_R D_R].$$

The conclusion $\bar{s} < s_b$ follows because demand is steeper and supply is flatter when segmentation is allowed than when it is banned.

- Demand is at its flattest when both investor types face the same pricing, as under a segmentation ban. Mathematically, $v(f_R)$ is minimized at $f_R^{\text{ban}} = \frac{\omega_R}{\omega_R + \omega_I}$. To understand the intuition, compare the following two extremes. On the one hand, a value $f_R = \frac{\omega_R}{\omega_R + \omega_I}$ obtains when both investor types face the same spread s . In that case, total quantity demanded is $\lambda_R(s) + \lambda_I(s) = (\zeta - s)(\omega_R + \omega_I)$, implying a demand curve with slope $v\left(\frac{\omega_R}{\omega_R + \omega_I}\right) = \frac{1}{\omega_R + \omega_I}$. On the other hand, a value $f_R = 1$ obtains when all I -investors are priced out of the market. In that case, total quantity demanded is entirely determined by the R -investors: $\lambda_R(s) = (\zeta - s)\omega_R$, implying $v(1) = \frac{1}{\omega_R}$. Being at its flattest when segmentation is banned, demand must be steeper when segmentation is allowed.
- Furthermore, supply is flatter when segmentation is allowed, in the sense that the ensuing increase in f_R causes a decrease in $c(f_R)$. The intuition is that when segmentation is allowed, market makers siphon R -orders, precisely because doing so reduces their inventory costs. Formally, $c(f_R^{\text{no-ban}}) < c(f_R^{\text{ban}})$ follows from two facts. First, $c(\cdot)$ is quadratic and convex. Indeed, we can compute $c(f_R) = \frac{\gamma}{M}[(1 - f_R)^2\sigma_I^2 + 2f_R(1 - f_R)\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R + f_R^2\sigma_R^2]$. Second, $f_R^{\text{ban}} < f_R^{\text{no-ban}} \leq \arg \min_{f_R} c(f_R)$. We have already seen that $f_R^{\text{ban}} < f_R^{\text{no-ban}}$. To see $f_R^{\text{no-ban}} \leq \arg \min_{f_R} c(f_R)$, consider a benchmark in which R - and I -orders could be procured at the same spread. In that benchmark, a market maker would optimally procure a portfolio in which the fraction of R -orders was $\arg \min_{f_R} c(f_R)$. But because $\Delta < 0$, we have $s_2 \leq s_1$ in the no-ban equilibrium, rendering R -orders (weakly) less attractive to market makers than they would be in the aforementioned benchmark. As a result, $f_R^{\text{no-ban}} \leq \arg \min_{f_R} c(f_R)$.

Intuition for why $s_1 < s_b$ is possible. Recall the maintained assumption $\Delta < 0$, which, following the discussion after (11), implies that

R -orders exert a lower marginal inventory cost on market makers than I -orders. Under a segmentation ban, both types are pooled together and are priced at the volume-weighted average of their marginal costs. Once segmentation is allowed, each type is charged a spread equal to its own marginal cost, creating two effects:

- The first effect can be understood through what would happen if liquidity demand were perfectly inelastic. In that case, the less costly R -investors would be charged less ($s_2 < s_b$), and the more costly I -investors would be charged more ($s_1 > s_b$).
- Crucially, however, liquidity demand is not perfectly inelastic. If R -investors are charged less, then R -investor volume increases. How this affects the marginal inventory cost of I -orders depends on ρ . If $\rho > 0$ ($\rho < 0$), additional R -investor volume raises (lowers) the marginal cost of I -orders, reinforcing (counteracting) the first effect.

It follows that $s_1 < s_b$ if and only if ρ is sufficiently negative. Proposition 4 provides the exact condition. The economic force discussed above echoes a concern raised by the SEC in its recently-proposed Order Competition Rule (p. 298, SEC, 2022): "a reduction in the volume of individual investor order flow internalized by wholesalers could increase wholesaler inventory risk, which in turn could cause wholesalers to reduce the liquidity they supply as exchange market makers."

Relation to the empirical literature. Proposition 4 speaks to how off-exchange siphoning affects on-exchange liquidity. Much empirical literature has examined this question. On the one hand, on-exchange liquidity does not seem to have been harmed by off-exchange siphoning in certain settings (e.g., Battalio, 1997; Battalio et al., 1997; Garriott and Walton, 2018; Elsas et al., 2022), which is consistent with our inventory-based theory but inconsistent with the information-based theories mentioned earlier. On the other hand, on-exchange liquidity does seem to have deteriorated in response to off-exchange siphoning in other settings (e.g., Degryse et al., 2015; Hatheway et al., 2017; Comerton-Forde et al., 2018; Hu and Murphy, 2022), which is consistent both with our inventory-based theory and with the information-based ones.

Discussion of Fig. 1. Fig. 1 illustrates bid-ask spreads as a function of the correlation parameter ρ , under parameters consistent with the discussion in Section 3.3: we set $\sigma_R = 0.2$ and $\sigma_I = 0.5$ to be consistent with the estimates of Jones et al. (2023), and we also set $\omega_R/\omega_I = 1/2$. As Proposition 4 states: (i) $s_b > s_2$ and $s_b > \bar{s}$ in the figure, regardless of ρ , and (ii) $s_b > s_1$ if and only if ρ is sufficiently negative, where for these parameters, the precise cutoff is $\rho = -1/2$. The estimates of Jones et al. (2023) indicate correlations not far from this cutoff, suggesting that $s_1 < s_b$ is in fact a realistic possibility.

The figure also indicates how spreads vary with ρ . Roughly speaking, there are two effects. First, as ρ increases, R - and I -orders become less likely to offset. A given order portfolio therefore creates greater inventory risk, so market makers require larger spreads to compensate. This effect drives the initial increase of all spreads seen in Fig. 1. Second, as spreads change, investors' participation decisions may change, and a market maker's order portfolio changes as well. For the parametrization of Fig. 1, in the limit as $\rho \rightarrow 1$, $s_1 \rightarrow \zeta$, implying that I -investors stop participating altogether, which reduces the marginal cost of R -orders, driving the subsequent decrease of s_2 .

4.1.2. The rise of retail trading

Recent years have seen a rapid growth in retail trading activity. In the U.S. equity market, retail trading volume doubled from about \$15 billion per day before 2017 to about \$30 billion in 2022 (Mackintosh, 2022). This trend can be modeled as an increase in the parameter ω_R .




Fig. 2. Bid-ask spreads: the rise of retail trading. This figure shows how various (half) bid-ask spreads change as retail trading demand increases. Panels (a) and (b) illustrate the cases of negative and positive order flow correlations ($\rho = -0.5$ and $\rho = 0.5$, respectively) between retail and institutional order flows. In both Panels (a) and (b), price improvement $s_1 - s_2$ is decreasing in ω_R ; Panel (c) illustrates an example with increasing price improvement (with $\rho = 0.95$). The magnitude of retail demand ω_R varies on the horizontal axes. The other parameters are set at $M = 3$, $\gamma = \zeta = 1$, $\omega_I = 100$, $\sigma_I = 0.5$, $\sigma_R = 0.2$, and $\mu_I = \mu_R = 0$. The vertical dotted line in (c) indicates the upper bound on ω_R implied by (12): when ω_R exceeds that bound, no trading occurs on-exchange.

Proposition 5 (*Rise of retail trading and spreads*). As the magnitude of retail demand ω_R increases,

- the off-exchange half spread, s_2 , monotonically increases;
- the on-exchange half spread, s_1 , monotonically increases (decreases) if $\rho > 0$ (< 0); and
- price improvement, $s_1 - s_2$, monotonically decreases (increases) if $\rho < \hat{\rho}$ ($> \hat{\rho}$), where the threshold $\hat{\rho}$ is a function of other parameters (given in equation (D.5) in the proof) and is strictly positive.

Fig. 2 illustrates these effects. The off-exchange spread s_2 (the dashed line) rises with ω_R . This is intuitive: the increase in R -investor liquidity demand requires market makers to handle larger volumes, hence also higher inventory costs.

As can be seen by comparing Panels (a) and (b), the effect of ω_R on the on-exchange spread s_1 (the solid line) depends on the order flow correlation ρ . If $\rho > 0$ (< 0), the increase in R -orders worsens (alleviates) the market makers' overall inventory costs through its correlation with the I -orders. In other words, as the “retail army” rises, it exerts a negative (positive) externality on other investors who on average trade in the same (opposite) direction.

The same force underlies how ω_R affects the price improvement $s_1 - s_2$. Clearly, when $\rho < 0$, $s_1 - s_2$ decreases with ω_R , because s_1 decreases and s_2 increases. If $\rho > 0$ instead, then the effect depends on the relative

speed of the increases in s_1 and in s_2 . As Proposition 5 states, s_1 is faster only if ρ is sufficiently positive. Intuitively, this is exactly the case where, as ω_R increases, R -investors' negative externality on I -investors is particularly strong, thus pushing up s_1 very quickly. Fig. 2(c) depicts such an example.

Our predictions regarding how retail trading activity affects spreads and price improvement can be empirically tested. In particular, Proposition 5 predicts that ω_R affects the on-exchange spread s_1 , and moreover that the direction of the effect depends on the sign of the order flow correlation ρ . These are novel predictions. To compare, under the information-based theories of PFOF, as long as all (uninformed) R -orders are siphoned off-exchange, the adverse-selection risk of the on-exchange I -orders is unaffected by ω_R , and so is the on-exchange spread s_1 .

4.1.3. The size of the market making sector

Another focal point in debates over PFOF is the concentration of the market making sector (e.g., Hu and Murphy, 2022). Would entry of additional market makers drive down investors' trading costs? Our model generates predictions along this line via comparative statics with respect to the size of the market-making sector, M . Perhaps surprisingly, the implications of a change in M are nuanced.




Fig. 3. Bid-ask spreads: the size of the market making sector. This figure shows how various (half) bid-ask spreads change as the market making sector grows. Panels (a) and (b) illustrate the cases of moderate and negative order flow correlations, $\rho = 0$ and $\rho = -0.95$, respectively. The size of the market making sector M varies from 0.1 to 1,000 on the horizontal axes. The other parameters are set at $\gamma = \zeta = 1$, $\omega_I = 100$, $\omega_R = 50$, $\sigma_I = 0.5$, $\sigma_R = 0.2$, and $\mu_I = \mu_R = 0$.

Fig. 3 plots the various spreads against M . In the limit of $M \rightarrow \infty$, in both panels, the spreads converge to $\frac{\gamma}{2}$, which is 0.5 in the numerical illustration. This is because, in the limit, an infinite measure of market makers compete for a finite measure of orders, and, therefore, each market maker expects to receive at most one order. Hence, the limiting spread equals the marginal cost of one unit of inventory, which is $\frac{\gamma}{2}$.

However, the convergence to $\frac{\gamma}{2}$ is not always monotone. In particular, if the order flow correlation ρ is sufficiently negative, as in Panel (b), the off-exchange spread s_2 is U-shaped. Accordingly, the volume-weighted average spread $\bar{s}$ is also non-monotone. This implies that a larger market making sector might actually raise investors' trading costs.

Proposition 6 (*Size of the market making sector and spreads*). *As the size of the market making sector M increases,*

- the on-exchange half spread, s_1 , monotonically decreases;
- the off-exchange half spread, s_2 , initially decreases but eventually increases (i.e., is U-shaped in M) if $\rho < -\frac{\sigma_R \omega_R}{\sigma_I \omega_I}$, and it monotonically decreases otherwise.

To see how this happens, note that the off-exchange spread s_2 may, in fact, drop below $\frac{\gamma}{2}$ under the parameterization of Fig. 3(b). Were it not for I -orders, market makers would lose money when providing liquidity to R -investors at such a spread, following (4). Why are they willing to provide liquidity to R -orders at such a small spread? This is because the acquired R -orders aid in hedging I -orders, thanks to the negative order flow correlation ρ . In other words, the inventory cost savings from hedging I -orders subsidizes losses in providing liquidity to R -orders. Mapping to the real world, this “subsidy” effect helps explain why market makers are willing to provide significant price improvements to their purchased retail orders (cf. Remark 5).

The U-shape of s_2 is given by two countervailing effects of M . First is an intuitive “supply effect.” As M increases, the total liquidity supply curve $Mx_{m2}(s)$ to R -investors increases, and the market makers effectively walk down the decreasing demand curve given by $\lambda_R(s_2)$. Second, as explained in the previous paragraph, s_2 may decrease below $\frac{\gamma}{2}$ when ρ is sufficiently negative. In that case, s_2 must be eventually increasing in M , because, as we have previously observed, s_2 converges to $\frac{\gamma}{2}$ (the marginal cost of the first unit of inventory) as $M \rightarrow \infty$.




Fig. 4. Market maker profits. This figure shows how the size of the market making sector M affects a market maker's expected profit π with versus without a segmentation ban. The other parameters are set at $\gamma = \zeta = 1$, $\omega_I = 100$, $\omega_R = 50$, $\sigma_I = 0.5$, $\sigma_R = 0.2$, $\rho = -0.3$, and $\mu_I = \mu_R = 0$.

4.2. Market maker profitability

We now turn to market maker profitability, denoted π with segmentation and π_b under the ban. An insight from the model is that market makers might face a “prisoner's dilemma” in which each unilaterally wants to siphon R -orders off-exchange and yet, collectively they would be better off if they all refrained from doing so. In such cases, a segmentation ban actually benefits market makers. Such a prisoner's dilemma can be seen in Fig. 4 where the solid line falls below the dashed line—with sufficiently many market makers.

Proposition 7 (*Market maker profits*). *Market maker profits are higher under the segmentation ban, i.e., $\pi > \pi_b$, if and only if $M < \hat{M}$, where $\hat{M}$ denotes the unique strictly positive root of a cubic polynomial given by equation (D.6) in the proof.*

How does the prisoner's dilemma arise in this context? As we have seen in Section 3.2, under the maintained assumption that $\Delta < 0$, each market maker individually benefits from siphoning, as it provides flexibility for tailoring exposure to R - and I -order flows. However, when all market makers collectively siphon, that changes the order flow composition (i.e., the $F(\alpha)$ matrix) as well as the liquidity demands $\lambda_1(\cdot)$ and $\lambda_2(\cdot)$. Equilibrium spreads then also change—potentially in a way




Fig. 5. Welfare. This figure shows how total welfare is affected by the magnitude of retail liquidity demand ω_R in Panel (a) and the order flow correlation ρ in Panel (b). For Panel (a), $\rho = -0.3$; for Panel (b), $\omega_R = 50$. The other parameters are set at $M = 3$, $\gamma = \zeta = 1$, $\omega_I = 100$, $\sigma_I = 0.5$, $\sigma_R = 0.2$, and $\mu_I = \mu_R = 0$.

that harms market makers. Indeed, Proposition 4 has established that the volume-weighted average spread is lower when segmentation is allowed (i.e., $\bar{s} < s_b$).

A prisoner's dilemma emerges when the negative pecuniary externality (lowered spread revenues) outweighs the individual benefit of segmentation (flexibility for tailoring order flow exposures). Externalities often loom large when more parties are involved, so that as indicated by the proposition, the prisoner's dilemma arises when M is sufficiently large.

A puzzle is why some market makers (e.g., Citadel as quoted in Footnote 3) have been quite open to a potential segmentation ban—after all, such a ban would undermine a core aspect of their current business model. Our analysis highlights a novel explanation for this puzzle: a segmentation ban might actually benefit market makers by resolving a prisoner's dilemma among them.

Comparison with information-based theories of PFOF. Inventory costs are central to this prisoner's dilemma. To see this, compare our model to Easley et al. (1996) and other existing models of PFOF, which do not feature inventory costs (but asymmetric information instead). In these models, market makers earn zero profits—both in the equilibrium with segmentation and in the equilibrium segmentation is banned—so that this type of prisoner's dilemma cannot arise.

4.3. Welfare

Finally, we turn to welfare. We first derive a general expression for total welfare—the sum of the investors' and the market makers' surplus. To do so, note that each individual market maker expects to receive Poisson-distributed numbers of R - and I -orders. Define x_I and x_R as the respective expectations of these Poisson random variables. Similarly, define s_I and s_R as the respective spreads charged to R - and I -orders.

Now we consider investor surplus. Under the maintained assumption of this section (p. 8), $s_k \leq \zeta$ for $k \in \{I, R\}$ holds in equilibrium both with and without the segmentation ban. Then the k -investors' inverse demand curve is $s(q) = \zeta - \frac{q}{\omega_k}$ and their surplus can be computed as

$$\int_0^{Mx_k} \left(\zeta - \frac{q}{\omega_k} - s_k \right) dq = (Mx_k)\zeta - \frac{(Mx_k)^2}{2\omega_k} - (Mx_k)s_k.$$

An individual market maker's surplus is given by

$$x_I s_I + x_R s_R - \frac{\gamma}{2}(x_I + x_R) - \frac{\gamma}{2}(x_I^2 \sigma_I^2 + 2\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R x_I x_R + x_R^2 \sigma_R^2).$$

Summing the above, noting that there is a measure of M market makers in total, we obtain the welfare expression:

$$w(x_I, x_R) = \sum_{k \in \{I, R\}} \left[(Mx_k) \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) - \frac{(Mx_k)^2}{2\omega_k} \right] - \frac{M\gamma}{2} (x_I^2 \sigma_I^2 + 2\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R x_I x_R + x_R^2 \sigma_R^2). \quad (14)$$

By substituting the corresponding equilibrium supplies x_k , this welfare expression applies generally to any equilibrium. Let w and w_b respectively denote equilibrium welfare with segmentation and under the ban. In the model, a segmentation ban can only reduce welfare (i.e., $w_b < w$). This follows from a stronger result—that the equilibrium without a segmentation ban in fact leads to the welfare-maximizing (x_I, x_R) . Fig. 5 illustrates.

Proposition 8 (Segmentation ban and welfare). *Absent a segmentation ban, the equilibrium outcome maximizes total welfare, hence, $w > w_b$.*

That the equilibrium without a segmentation ban leads to the welfare-maximizing outcome essentially follows from the First Welfare Theorem. For example, our model features competitive pricing, no externalities (aside from pecuniary ones), and separate “prices” (spreads s_1 and s_2) for each and every different “good” (liquidity to R - and I -orders). With a segmentation ban in place, the First Welfare Theorem no longer applies, for we then have only a single “price” (s_b) for the two “goods.” The reason for strict (rather than weak) inequality in Proposition 8 is the maintained assumption $\Delta < 0$, which implies that the segmentation ban bites.

Our result adds to recent policy discussions about PFOF. Both in the U.S. and in Europe, financial market regulators have expressed concerns regarding PFOF as well as intentions to ban it.²² Their arguments largely refer to negative effects of PFOF that are not captured by our model. For example, some have argued that the practice poses conflicts of interest, as a broker would “choose the [market maker] offering the highest payment, rather than the best possible outcome for its clients” (ESMA, 2021). The SEC chair, Gary Gensler, also warns that via PFOF, “[market makers] get the data, they get the first look, they get to match

²² Following the discussion in Footnote 2, what precisely would be banned often varies: (i) some have discussed banning the practice whereby retail orders are routed directly to market makers and executed off-exchange—what we have called a “segmentation ban,” while (ii) others have discussed banning only the accompanying payments that are often transferred from market makers to retail brokers. Our analysis speaks only to the implications of (i).

off buyers and sellers out of that order flow” (Barron’s, 2021). Our welfare result, as stated in Proposition 8 above, cuts in the opposite direction. We contribute to these discussions by highlighting the benefit of order flow segmentation, in a stylized setting featuring market makers’ inventory concerns.

Comparison with information-based theories of PFOF. The first part of Proposition 8 says that, without a segmentation ban, the equilibrium outcome maximizes welfare. No analogous result typically holds in information-based theories of PFOF, for the reason that adverse selection generally invalidates the First Welfare Theorem. The second part of Proposition 8 says that a segmentation ban would reduce welfare. No analogous welfare comparison is made in many information-based models of PFOF (e.g., Easley et al., 1996; Battalio and Holden, 2001), for the reason that uninformed investors are assumed to be price-inelastic in those models, so that a segmentation ban has no effect on total welfare. Incorporating an elasticity into those models could, however, permit an analogous result in certain cases.

5. Conclusion

This paper studies order flow segmentation from the novel perspective of market makers’ inventory management. In isolation, a given source of orders is riskier for market makers to intermediate if it is more likely to exhibit significant directionality. Yet, market makers typically intermediate order flow from several sources, whose directionalities are potentially correlated. These considerations incentivize market makers to form portfolios of liquidity supply to different order flows, so as to optimally balance spread revenues against overall inventory costs. While the portfolio perspective on inventory management *across assets* has been previously examined in the literature (Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1983), our portfolio perspective on inventory management *across order flows* of the same asset is new.

In a setting tailored to PFOF, we show that siphoning specific types of orders off-exchange may be a part of portfolio-based inventory management by market makers. That is, order flow segmentation can endogenously emerge out of inventory considerations. Our inventory perspective on PFOF moreover makes novel predictions about consequences of regulations that ban order flow segmentation.

As we have pointed out, there are a variety of empirical facts, which our inventory-based theory can explain, but which an information-based theory of PFOF would struggle to explain on its own. See, for example, our discussion of the empirical literature on how off-exchange siphoning affects on-exchange liquidity (on p. 9). It follows that information cannot constitute the entire explanation for why retail orders have been siphoned off-exchange—considerations of inventory, like those we model, play a role also. A more challenging question, which could be addressed in future work, concerns the relative importance of information versus inventory in driving this siphoning. One way to address this question would be by assembling and estimating a structural model that is rich enough to encompass both frictions.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Markus Baldauf: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Software, Supervision, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. **Joshua Mollner:** Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Software, Supervision, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. **Bart Zhou Yueshen:** Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Software, Supervision, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Appendix A. Notation

Notation used in Section 2

Exogenous parameters

J	number of marketplaces	} Endogenized in Section 3
$\lambda_j(\cdot)$	measure of liquidity-demanding orders on marketplace j	
D_j	(random) directionality of liquidity-demanding orders on marketplace j	
μ	$E[(D_1, D_2, \dots, D_J)^T]$	
Σ	$\text{var}[(D_1, D_2, \dots, D_J)^T]$	
M	measure of market makers	
γ	parametrization of market maker inventory costs	

Endogenous variables

s_j	half bid-ask spread of marketplace j
x_{mj}	Poisson intensity of liquidity supply for market maker m on marketplace j
Q_{mj}	(random) volume of market maker m on marketplace j
Z_{mj}	(random) net inventory of market maker m on marketplace j
π_m	expected profit of market maker m

Additional notation used in Sections 3–4

Exogenous parameters

$\lambda_k(\cdot)$	measure of type- k liquidity-demanding orders
ζ	maximum acceptable half spread
ω_k	magnitude of type- k liquidity demand
D_k	(random) directionality of type- k liquidity demand
Σ_o	$\text{var}[(D_I, D_R)^T]$
σ_k	$\text{sd}(D_k)$
ρ	$\text{corr}(D_I, D_R)$
Δ	$(\sigma_R^2 \omega_R + \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_I) - (\sigma_I^2 \omega_I + \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_R)$

Endogenous variables

α	fraction of R -orders routed off-exchange (i.e., to marketplace 2)
$F(\alpha)$	order flow weighting matrix
$\bar{s}$	volume-weighted average half spread
π	market maker profitability
w	total welfare
b	subscript to indicate that segmentation is banned, as in s_b , π_b , and w_b

Additional notation used in Appendix B

Exogenous parameters

D_I°	(random) I -directionality, before crossing in the midpoint dark pool
-------------	---

Additional notation used in Appendix C

Exogenous parameters

t	time period ($t \in \{1, 2\}$); superscripted on other variables as “(t)”
ϕ_k	autocorrelation of type- k order flow

Endogenous variables

$\pi_m^{(t)}$	a market maker m ’s expected profit, before period t trading
$z_m^{(t)}$	a market maker m ’s inventory after period t trading
$\bar{z}^{(t)}$	market makers’ average inventory after period t trading
$I_m^{(1)}$	$\{z_m^{(1)}, D_I^{(1)}, \bar{z}^{(1)}\}$
$\Delta^{(2)}$	$(\phi_I D_I^{(1)} M \bar{z}^{(1)}) / (\zeta - \frac{\zeta}{2}) - \sigma_I^2 \omega_I$

Appendix B. Extension: adding a midpoint dark pool

In Section 3, we assume that I -investors can trade on-exchange only. Yet, in reality, institutional investors do occasionally trade off-exchange. Nevertheless, the off-exchange venues on which institutional investors tend to trade differ in crucial ways from off-exchange execution of retail orders, which we have modeled. For example, institutional investors often trade in midpoint dark pools. In these venues, the spread is not determined by market clearing (as it is for off-exchange retail execution); rather the spread is zero by construction. Accordingly, these

markets may fail to clear, in the sense that an order routed to a midpoint dark pool might fail to execute, if it cannot be crossed against a corresponding order in the other direction.

We study in this appendix a model extension that additionally features a midpoint dark pool, in which I -investors can first cross their liquidity demand. Our formulation of this dark pool is standard, following, for example, Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) and Zhu (2014).²³ The extension also suggests an additional microfoundation for why it is likely that $\sigma_R < \sigma_I$, complementing the empirical evidence discussed in Section 3.3.

I-investor characteristics. We follow the discussion on microfoundation in Section 2.1 to model I -orders: There is a continuum of measure κ_I of I -investors, each of whom wants to trade one unit of the asset. Each of them has an i.i.d. private value for the asset: it is positive with probability $\frac{1}{2}(1 + D_I^\circ)$ (and negative otherwise), and its magnitude is distributed according to the c.d.f. $F_I(\cdot)$.

Note that we use D_I° to denote the “original” directionality of I -investors’ trading needs. It is randomly distributed on $[-1, 1]$, where we assume that $D_I^\circ \neq 0$ almost surely and that the distribution is symmetric around 0. As in the main text, we use D_I to denote the directionality of the I -flow that enters the exchange. Below we shall see how D_I° endogenously affects—hence also differs from— D_I .

Trading. In aggregate, a fraction $\frac{1}{2}(1 + D_I^\circ)$ of these I -investors want to buy and the rest $\frac{1}{2}(1 - D_I^\circ)$ want to sell. Upon arrival, an I -investor seeks liquidity according to the following pecking order:

- First, she sends an order, in the direction of her private value, to the midpoint dark pool, on which offsetting orders are randomly matched. If her order is on the short side, it is always matched; if it is on the long side, it is matched only with probability $\frac{1 - |D_I^\circ|}{1 + |D_I^\circ|}$.²⁴ Once matched, the order trades at the “midpoint,” i.e., at zero spread. Midpoint dark pool volume is then publicly observed.
- Second, only if unmatched in the midpoint dark pool, she sends an IOC order with a limit price reflecting her private value to the exchange, where market makers provide liquidity according to the setup in Section 2.1.

Compared to Section 2.1, the key difference is the added possibility of crossing in the midpoint dark pool. In particular, we have assumed that I -investors always first attempt crossing at the midpoint dark pool before turning to the exchange. Although we take this pecking order as exogenous, it would in fact arise endogenously: if an I -investor succeeds in her attempt to trade at the dark pool, then she will have traded at a spread of zero, leaving her better off than if she had instead traded at a positive spread on the exchange; and if she fails in her attempt to trade at the dark pool, then she is no worse off for having tried.

Midpoint dark pool volume is therefore

$$\min \left\{ \frac{1}{2}(1 + D_I^\circ)\kappa_I, \frac{1}{2}(1 - D_I^\circ)\kappa_I \right\} = \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - |D_I^\circ| \right) \kappa_I,$$

and, therefore, IOC orders sent by unmatched I -investors to the exchange have measure

$$\left| \frac{1}{2}(1 + D_I^\circ)\kappa_I - \frac{1}{2}(1 - D_I^\circ)\kappa_I \right| = |D_I^\circ| \kappa_I =: \omega_I.$$

Further, these on-exchange IOC orders will all have the same sign. Formally,

²³ There are many different forms of dark pools, as detailed in Menkveld et al. (2017). In this extension, we consider a midpoint dark pool because it is the most common form of dark trading in practice. For example, Nimalendran and Ray (2014) document that about 57% dark transactions are within 0.01% of the price around the midpoint.

²⁴ An I -buyer is on the short side (long side) if $D_I^\circ < 0$ (> 0). Vice versa, an I -seller is on the short side (long side) if $D_I^\circ > 0$ (< 0).

$$D_I = \text{sign} \left[\frac{1}{2}(1 + D_I^\circ) - \frac{1}{2}(1 - D_I^\circ) \right] = \text{sign}[D_I^\circ].$$

That is, the on-exchange I -order directionality D_I has a two-point distribution, with $\mathbb{P}[D_I = 1] = \mathbb{P}[D_I^\circ > 0] = \frac{1}{2}$ and $\mathbb{P}[D_I = -1] = \mathbb{P}[D_I^\circ < 0] = \frac{1}{2}$ (recall that D_I° is assumed to be symmetrically distributed around 0). The analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 can then be carried out with the above ω_I and D_I .

How the midpoint dark pool exacerbates the directionality of I -orders. As seen above, because I -investors naturally first turn to the cheaper midpoint dark pool to cross their orders, the residual on-exchange orders become more extreme, with $|D_I| = 1$. (Instead, in reality retail orders typically do not go through midpoint dark pools.) We argue this is one realistic mechanism through which I -orders are more likely to be directional than R -orders, i.e., why $\sigma_R < \sigma_I$. Indeed, $\sigma_I^2 = \text{var}[D_I] = 1$ following the above analysis, while by definition $\sigma_R^2 \leq 1$.

Appendix C. Extension: dynamics

In the model, market makers’ liquidity-supply decisions can be interpreted as their limit orders, their ex-ante allocation of groundwork, or their negotiations with brokers (see Remark 3). In Sections 2 and 3, we assume that these decisions are made once, before trading starts. In this section, we relax this assumption and examine how market makers supply liquidity dynamically.

In C.1, we describe the model setup. To keep the analysis tractable and to highlight the main insights, we also introduce a few simplifying assumptions. We then characterize the equilibrium in C.2, showing that market makers’ incentive to siphon R -orders remains intact. In fact, this dynamic extension highlights a novel effect that further incentivizes siphoning. This new mechanism arises from two unique features of the dynamic extension: (1) market makers inherit inventories accumulated in previous periods, and (2) these inventories can be correlated with future orders because of autocorrelation in order flows.

C.1. Setup

Timing. There are two trading periods $t \in \{1, 2\}$. As in Section 3, there are two marketplaces $j \in \{1, 2\}$, where 1 denotes on-exchange and 2 off-exchange trading. In each period t , each market maker $m \in [0, M]$ chooses her liquidity supply for the two marketplaces $\mathbf{x}_m^{(t)} = (x_{m1}^{(t)}, x_{m2}^{(t)})^\top$, where the superscript “(t)” indicates the period. The period- t half spreads for these two marketplaces are denoted $\mathbf{s}^{(t)} = (s_1^{(t)}, s_2^{(t)})^\top$ and will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. A market maker’s profit is her spread revenue (across both marketplaces and both time periods) minus $\frac{\lambda}{2}$ times the square of her terminal inventory.

Liquidity demand. As in Section 3, there are two types of investors, $k \in \{R, I\}$. For simplicity, their liquidity demands are assumed to be time-invariant, i.e., $\lambda_k^{(t)}(s) = \lambda_k(s) = \max\{0, (\zeta - s)\omega_k\}$, for both $t \in \{1, 2\}$. Whereas we permitted an arbitrary joint distribution for directionalities in previous sections, we impose additional structure here so as to introduce autocorrelation in a tractable way. Formally, we model directionalities as follows:

$$D_I^{(1)} = (-1)^{Y_I^{(1)}} \sigma_I, \quad D_I^{(2)} = X_I D_I^{(1)} + (1 - X_I)(-1)^{Y_I^{(2)}} \sigma_I, \\ \text{and } D_R^{(1)} = D_R^{(2)} = 0, \quad (\text{C.1})$$

where $\{Y_I^{(1)}, Y_I^{(2)}, X_I\}$ are independent Bernoulli draws with respective success rates $\{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \phi_I\}$ with $\phi_I \in [0, 1]$ and $\sigma_I \in (0, 1]$. In words, for each period t , I -orders will realize a directionality $D_I^{(t)}$ of either $\pm\sigma_I$, yet are unconditionally balanced, with $\mathbb{E}[D_I^{(t)}] = 0$. The period-2 directionality $D_I^{(2)}$ remains equal to the period-1 directionality $D_I^{(1)}$ with probability ϕ_I and is an i.i.d. new draw with probability $1 - \phi_I$. In contrast, we assume that R -orders lack directionality altogether, which

lends tractability while simultaneously encoding the realistic feature that R -orders are less directional than I -orders (as discussed in Section 3.3).²⁵

Siphoning. In each period $t \in \{1, 2\}$, a fraction $\alpha^{(t)} \in [0, 1]$ of the R -orders is endogenously siphoned off-exchange, so that the marketplace-level directionalities are $\mathbf{D}^{(t)} = \mathbf{F}(\alpha^{(t)}) (\mathbf{D}_I^{(t)}, \mathbf{D}_R^{(t)})^\top$, where the weighting matrix $\mathbf{F}(\cdot)$ remains as in (6). As in Section 3, brokers honor the best-execution requirement, so that $s_1^{(t)} \leq (\geq) s_2^{(t)}$ if $\alpha^{(t)} < 1 (> 0)$; see (7a)–(7b) and Remark 5.

Trading outcomes from $t = 1$. After the $t = 1$ trading, a market maker m observes $\mathcal{I}_m^{(1)} = \{z_m^{(1)}, D_I^{(1)}, \bar{z}^{(1)}\}$, where $z_m^{(1)}$ is the market maker's own inventory at that time, and $\bar{z}^{(1)} := \frac{1}{M} \int_0^M z_m^{(1)} dm$ is the average inventory across all market makers. Naturally, the market maker knows her own $z_m^{(1)}$. She can further infer $D_I^{(1)}$ and $\bar{z}^{(1)}$, for example, from a public data feed.²⁶

Equilibrium definition. Analogous to Section 3.1, an equilibrium consists of, for both $t \in \{1, 2\}$, liquidity supplies $\mathbf{x}_m^{(t)}$ for each market maker m , siphoning fractions $\alpha^{(t)}$, and half spreads $s^{(t)}$. In particular, for $t = 2$, a market maker m 's supply $\mathbf{x}_m^{(2)}$ can depend on her own information $\mathcal{I}_m^{(1)}$, while the market-wide variables, $\alpha^{(2)}$ and $s^{(2)}$ can depend on $\cup_{m \in [0, M]} \mathcal{I}_m^{(1)}$. The equilibrium conditions determining these endogenous variables are: (i) each market maker m chooses her liquidity-supply strategy $\{\mathbf{x}_m^{(1)}, \mathbf{x}_m^{(2)}\}$ to maximize her expected profit—not only in the entire game but also in each $t = 2$ subgame (as in the spirit of subgame perfection); (ii) market clearing holds for each marketplace j (in every subgame), and (iii) the best-execution requirement is satisfied (in every subgame).

Comparison with existing literature. A key feature of our analysis is that we consider an environment with two marketplaces, so as to highlight endogenous order flow segmentation—the off-exchange siphoning of retail orders. In contrast, existing inventory-based models of dynamic liquidity supply typically consider only a single venue; see, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983), and Hendershott and Menkveld (2014).²⁷

Different from the above literature, we maintain the standing assumption that each marketplace's midpoint is fixed at the asset's fair value throughout the two periods (so that only the spreads $s^{(t)}$ remain to be determined in equilibrium). Hendershott and Mendelson (2000)

make a similar assumption. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this assumption is a substantive one, as market makers would have incentives to skew their quotes against their inventories. For example, if a market maker becomes long, then she would set the midquote below the fair value, so as to encourage buyers and discourage sellers. Such “price pressure” is a key insight from the above literature.

By fixing the midpoint, we effectively ignore how market makers might use price pressures to manage their inventories over time. In return, we obtain the tractability necessary to demonstrate the robustness of our main result—that even in a dynamic framework, market makers' incentive to segment orders persists. In other words, our analysis highlights that order flow segmentation can serve as a further tool—in addition to price pressure—with which market makers can manage their inventories. We leave it as an open question for future research how these two tools might interact with each other.

C.2. Equilibrium

The equilibrium is solved backwards: We first derive the $t = 2$ equilibrium objects for any given $t = 1$ trading outcomes. This gives market makers' continuation values, with which we then solve for the $t = 1$ equilibrium objects.

C.2.1. Period 2

The analysis for period 2 is similar to that for the single-period model, with two key differences. First, given her observation $\mathcal{I}_m^{(1)}$ from $t = 1$, each market maker m possesses information about the $t = 2$ directionality of I -orders, $D_I^{(2)}$. In particular, all market makers observe the realized $t = 1$ directionality $D_I^{(1)}$, which following (C.1) is a sufficient statistic. For notational simplicity, we write $\mathbb{E}_1[\cdot] = \mathbb{E}[\cdot | D_I^{(1)}]$ and $\text{var}_1[\cdot] = \text{var}[\cdot | D_I^{(1)}]$. Therefore, by Bayes' rule, every market maker obtains the same posterior moments: $\mathbb{E}_1[D_I^{(2)}] = \phi_I D_I^{(1)}$, $\text{var}_1[D_I^{(2)}] = (1 - \phi_I^2)\sigma_I^2$, and we of course also have $\mathbb{E}_1[D_R^{(2)}] = 0$ and $\text{var}_1[D_R^{(2)}] = 0$. We write the posterior mean and variance of $\mathbf{D}^{(2)} = \mathbf{F}(\alpha^{(2)}) \cdot (D_I^{(2)}, D_R^{(2)})^\top$ as $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(2|1)}$ and $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{(2|1)}$, respectively, and derive their expressions in the proof of Lemma 3.

Second, in the single-period model, all market makers begin with zero inventory, whereas now in $t = 2$, each market maker m inherits from her trading at $t = 1$ the inventory $z_m^{(1)}$. We show in the proof of Lemma 3 that her objective now becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_m^{(2)}(\mathbf{x}_m^{(2)}; z_m^{(1)}, D_I^{(1)}) &= \mathbf{x}_m^{(2)\top} \left(s^{(2)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{1} \right) \\ &\quad - \frac{\gamma}{2} \left[\mathbf{x}_m^{(2)\top} \left(\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{(2|1)} + \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(2|1)} \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(2|1)\top} \right) \mathbf{x}_m^{(2)} - 2 \mathbf{x}_m^{(2)\top} \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(2|1)} z_m^{(1)} + (z_m^{(1)})^2 \right], \end{aligned} \quad (\text{C.2})$$

where she takes as given the half spreads $s^{(2)}$ and the siphoning fraction $\alpha^{(2)}$ (which determines $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{(2|1)}$ and $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(2|1)}$). Compared with the objective (4) in the single-period model, the last two terms in the squared-brackets are new. They arise from the market maker's existing inventory $z_m^{(1)}$: The expected inventory cost created by that existing inventory itself is proportional to $(z_m^{(1)})^2$, and that created by its covariance with her $t = 2$ trading is proportional to $-\mathbf{x}_m^{(2)\top} \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(2|1)} z_m^{(1)}$.

We show in the proof of Lemma 3 that the objective (C.2) is strictly concave in $\mathbf{x}_{m1}^{(2)}$ but linear in $\mathbf{x}_{m2}^{(2)}$. Therefore, the first-order condition determines the optimal $\mathbf{x}_{m1}^{(2)}$ (as a function of the on-exchange half spread $s_1^{(2)}$) and the off-exchange half spread $s_2^{(2)}$. Market clearing then determines the on-exchange half spread $s_1^{(2)}$ and the aggregate off-exchange liquidity supply. The equilibrium siphoning fraction $\alpha^{(2)}$ is determined by the best-execution requirement. The following lemma summarizes the results:

²⁵ Our analysis can be generalized to the case where R -order directionalities take the same functional form as for I -orders: $D_R^{(1)} = (-1)^{Y_R^{(1)}} \sigma_R$, and $D_R^{(2)} = X_R D_I^{(1)} + (1 - X_R)(-1)^{Y_R^{(2)}} \sigma_R$, where $\{Y_R^{(1)}, Y_R^{(2)}, X_R\}$ are independent Bernoulli draws with respective success rates $\{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \phi_R\}$ with $\phi_R \in [0, 1]$ and $\sigma_R \in [0, 1]$. In particular, the same key result (that retail orders are all siphoned off-exchange) will be obtained for sufficiently small $\sigma_R > 0$.

²⁶ For example, such a data feed may contain the on-exchange half spread $s_1^{(1)}$, trading volume $V^{(1)} := \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) + (1 - \alpha^{(1)})\lambda_R(s_1^{(1)})$, and order imbalance $I_1^{(1)} := \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)})D_I^{(1)} + (1 - \alpha^{(1)})\lambda_R(s_1^{(1)})D_R^{(1)} = \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)})D_I^{(1)}$ (where the last equality holds because $D_R^{(1)} = 0$). Each market maker can infer $D_I^{(1)}$ by solving those two equations for the two unknowns $D_I^{(1)}$ and $\alpha^{(1)}$. The average inventory also follows $\bar{z}^{(1)} = -\frac{1}{M} I_1^{(1)}$ (note that the off-exchange imbalance $I_2^{(2)} := \alpha^{(1)}\lambda_R(s_2^{(1)})D_R^{(1)}$ is zero and hence does not affect $\bar{z}^{(1)}$).

²⁷ In addition to considerations related to inventory management, the literature has also highlighted several other dimensions of strategic behavior in dynamic liquidity supply. For example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) analyze how competitive market makers dynamically supply liquidity in view of information asymmetry. Bernhardt et al. (2004) show that dealers provide better liquidity to frequent customers to secure future business. Desgranges and Foucault (2005) show that repeated trading relationships can shield a dealer from being adversely selected by a possibly-informed investor. Barbon et al. (2019) find evidence consistent with brokers leaking information about some of their clients' fire-selling orders to other clients.

Lemma 3 (Period 2). Given period-1 outcomes $D_I^{(1)}$ and $\bar{z}^{(1)}$, the period-2 continuation game always has an equilibrium. All equilibria are characterized as follows. Define

$$\Delta^{(2)} := \frac{\phi_I D_I^{(1)} M \bar{z}^{(1)}}{\zeta - \frac{\zeta}{2}} - \sigma_I^2 \omega_I. \quad (\text{C.3})$$

- (i) If $\Delta^{(2)} < 0$, then $\alpha^{(2)} = 1$.
- (ii) If $\Delta^{(2)} > 0$, then $\alpha^{(2)} = 0$.
- (iii) If $\Delta^{(2)} = 0$, then $\alpha^{(2)}$ can take any value in $[0, 1]$.

In all cases, the equilibrium half spreads $s_1^{(2)}$ and $s_2^{(2)}$ are defined by equations (D.9)–(D.10); equilibrium on-exchange liquidity supply $x_{m1}^{(2)}$ is given by (D.11); and equilibrium off-exchange aggregate liquidity supply $\int_0^M x_{m2}^{(2)} dm$ is given by (D.12) (but may be allocated arbitrarily among the individual market makers). Furthermore, when the market clears at $t = 1$ (as it would in equilibrium of the full game), we have $\alpha^{(2)} = 1$ (i.e., all R -orders are siphoned off-exchange in $t = 2$).

According to the last part of the lemma, in (the full game) equilibrium, all R -orders are siphoned off-exchange in $t = 2$. Two effects drive this equilibrium feature.

- First, suppose (contrary to the equilibrium) that all market makers were to enter period 2 without any inventory. This would imply that $\bar{z}^{(1)} = 0$, leading to $\Delta^{(2)} = -\omega_I \sigma_I^2 < 0$ by equation (C.3). Thus, even absent the inventories inherited from $t = 1$, R -orders would be siphoned off-exchange. The intuition is that R -orders, being balanced, would be cheaper than I -orders, being imbalanced, in terms of market makers' inventory costs. In fact, this first effect is implied by the analysis in Section 3, where R -orders are siphoned off-exchange if $\Delta < 0$.²⁸ In other words, the siphoning incentive identified in the single-period case remains robust in the dynamic extension.
- Second, the inventory that market makers bring into period 2 leads to an extra term in the expression for $\Delta^{(2)}$, namely $\phi_I D_I^{(1)} M \bar{z}^{(1)} / (\zeta - \frac{\zeta}{2})$. Equilibrium requires market clearing at $t = 1$ so that $M \bar{z}^{(1)} = -\lambda_I (s_1^{(1)}) D_I^{(1)}$. Plugging this in, the extra term becomes $-\phi_I \lambda_I (s_1^{(1)}) \sigma_I^2 / (\zeta - \frac{\zeta}{2})$, which makes $\Delta^{(2)}$ even more negative. The intuition is that autocorrelation in I -investor order flow implies that I -orders in $t = 2$ are on average expected to exacerbate market makers' inventories inherited from $t = 1$: I -investors are expected to buy (sell) in $t = 2$ precisely when market makers are short (long) on average, owing to I -orders from $t = 1$. This makes I -orders even less attractive relative to R -orders, further incentivizing market makers to siphon I -orders off-exchange.

²⁸ In Section 3, to simplify notation, we assumed $\mathbb{E}[D_I] = \mathbb{E}[D_R] = 0$ (cf. Footnote 12), so that $\Sigma + \mu\mu^\top$ reduces to Σ . Without such a simplification, it can be shown that the definition of Δ generalizes from (11) to $\Delta := (\mathbb{E}[D_R^2]\omega_R + \mathbb{E}[D_R D_I]\omega_I) - (\mathbb{E}[D_I^2]\omega_I + \mathbb{E}[D_R D_I]\omega_R)$; that is, $\sigma_k^2 = \text{var}[D_k]$ is replaced by $\mathbb{E}[D_k^2]$ and $\rho\sigma_R\sigma_I = \text{cov}[D_R, D_I]$ by $\mathbb{E}[D_R D_I]$. To adapt this generalized definition of Δ to the second-period phase of our dynamic model (for the case of $\bar{z}^{(1)} = 0$), we simply use the conditional expectation $\mathbb{E}_1[\cdot]$ and set $\sigma_R = 0$ to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta &= \underbrace{\left(\mathbb{E}_1 \left[(D_R^{(2)})^2 \right] \omega_R + \mathbb{E}_1 \left[D_R^{(2)} D_I^{(2)} \right] \omega_I \right)}_{=0} \\ &\quad - \underbrace{\left(\mathbb{E}_1 \left[(D_I^{(2)})^2 \right] \omega_I + \mathbb{E}_1 \left[D_R^{(2)} D_I^{(2)} \right] \omega_R \right)}_{=0} = -\omega_I \sigma_I^2 < 0, \end{aligned}$$

which exactly coincides with the result of setting $\bar{z}^{(1)} = 0$ in the expression for $\Delta^{(2)}$ given in (C.3).

The second effect above is new in the dynamic model. It arises only if I -orders are autocorrelated. Indeed, if $\phi_I = 0$, then in expectation, the average market maker's inventory $\bar{z}^{(1)}$ is no longer exacerbated by the period-2 I -orders.

C.2.2. Period 1

The equilibrium analysis for period 1 proceeds similarly. We sketch the steps below and defer details to the proof of Proposition 9. First, taking the spreads $s^{(1)}$ and siphoning $\alpha^{(1)}$ as given, a market maker m chooses her optimal liquidity supply $x_m^{(1)}$ to maximize

$$\pi_m^{(1)}(x_m^{(1)}) = x_m^{(1)\top} s^{(1)} + \mathbb{E} \left[\pi_m^{(2)}(x_m^{(2)}; z_m^{(1)}, D_I^{(1)}) \right],$$

which is the sum of her expected spread revenue from $t = 1$ and her expected continuation value $\pi_m^{(2)}(\cdot)$ as given in (C.2). Note that the choice variable $x_m^{(1)}$ affects the continuation value $\mathbb{E}[\pi_m^{(2)}(\cdot)]$ for it affects the distribution of $z_m^{(1)}$, the inventory that the market maker will acquire in $t = 1$. We derive the expression of $\pi_m^{(1)}$ in the proof of Proposition 9 and show that, analogous to $\pi_m^{(2)}$, it is strictly concave in $x_m^{(1)}$ but linear in $x_m^{(1)}$. We then proceed exactly as in C.2.1 for $t = 2$. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium.

Proposition 9 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium for the full game always exists. All equilibria are characterized as follows. In period 1, all R -orders are siphoned off-exchange, i.e., $\alpha^{(1)} = 1$; the equilibrium half spreads $s_1^{(1)}$ and $s_2^{(1)}$ are defined by (D.23) and (D.21); equilibrium on-exchange liquidity supply $x_{m1}^{(1)}$ is given by (D.22); and equilibrium off-exchange aggregate liquidity supply $\int_0^M x_{m2}^{(2)} dm$ is given by (D.24) (but may be allocated arbitrarily among the individual market makers). The period-2 equilibrium objects are as described in Lemma 3.

Although equilibrium (for the full game) is not unique, equilibrium does make a unique prediction regarding the spreads.²⁹ For period 1, these unique spreads entail $s_1^{(1)} > s_2^{(1)}$, consistent with how, according to the proposition, all R -orders are siphoned off-exchange in $t = 1$. This is because, as before, the R -orders are balanced and, thus, are relatively cheaper than the directional I -orders in terms of inventory costs. And as previously discussed, on the equilibrium path, all R -orders are also siphoned off-exchange in $t = 2$. Therefore, we conclude that the economic forces that drive siphoning are robust to the dynamic considerations we have modeled here.³⁰

Appendix D. Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. Consider first Z_{mj} , market maker m 's net inventory from marketplace j . Conditional on the realizations of $(Q_{mj})_{j=1}^J$, we have

$$\mathbb{E} \left[Z_{mj}^2 | Q_{mj} \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{i=1}^{Q_{mj}} (-1)^{2B_{mji}} + 2 \sum_{i \neq i'} (-1)^{B_{mji}} (-1)^{B_{mji'}} \right]$$

²⁹ The (full game) equilibrium is unique up to (i) how the aggregate off-exchange liquidity supply is allocated across market makers in each period, and (ii) how $\alpha^{(2)}$ is specified for the off-path period-2 subgames in which $\Delta^{(2)} = 0$.

³⁰ Interestingly, our model also entails a prediction on spread dynamics: It can be shown that for both marketplaces j , $s_j^{(1)} < s_j^{(2)}$. Intuitively, this is because the dynamic model allows market makers to flexibly adjust their liquidity supply over time. In fact, they have an incentive to frontload their liquidity supplies, because doing so resolves uncertainty while they still have time to react, which permits them to reduce the variance of their terminal inventory. For example, if a market maker received positive inventory after $t = 1$ and if she expects the $t = 2$ order flow to be buying (selling), then she can scale up (down) her liquidity supply in $t = 2$. As liquidity supply is frontloaded, spreads are narrower in $t = 1$ than in $t = 2$.

$$\begin{aligned}
&= Q_{mj} + (Q_{mj} - 1)Q_{mj} \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[(-1)^{B_{mji}} (-1)^{B_{mji'}} \mid D_j \right] \right] \\
&= Q_{mj} + (Q_{mj} - 1)Q_{mj} \mathbb{E} \left[D_j^2 \right] \\
&= Q_{mj} + (Q_{mj} - 1)Q_{mj} \cdot (\sigma_j^2 + \mu_j^2),
\end{aligned}$$

where (B_{mji}) are i.i.d. Bernoulli draws with success rate $\frac{1}{2}(1 + D_j)$, μ_j is the j -th element of $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, and σ_j^2 is the j -th diagonal element of $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$; and, for $j \neq j'$,

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{E} [Z_{mj} Z_{mj'} \mid Q_{mj}, Q_{mj'}] \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{Q_{mj}} \sum_{i'=1}^{Q_{mj'}} \mathbb{E} \left[(-1)^{B_{mji}} (-1)^{B_{mji'}} \mid D_j, D_{j'} \right] \\
&= Q_{mj} Q_{mj'} \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[(-1)^{B_{mji}} (-1)^{B_{mji'}} \mid D_j, D_{j'} \right] \right] \\
&= Q_{mj} Q_{mj'} \mathbb{E} [D_j D_{j'}] = Q_{mj} Q_{mj'} \cdot (\rho_{jj'} \sigma_j \sigma_{j'} + \mu_j \mu_{j'}),
\end{aligned}$$

where $\rho_{jj'}$ is the correlation between D_j and $D_{j'}$. The market maker's total net inventory is $Z_m := \sum_{j=1}^J Z_{mj}$, and

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{E} [Z_m^2 \mid Q_{m1}, \dots, Q_{mJ}] \\
&= \sum_{j=1}^J \mathbb{E} [Z_{mj}^2 \mid Q_{mj}] + \sum_{j \neq j'} \mathbb{E} [Z_{mj} Z_{mj'} \mid Q_{mj}, Q_{mj'}] \\
&= \sum_{j=1}^J (Q_{mj} + (Q_{mj} - 1)Q_{mj}(\sigma_j^2 + \mu_j^2)) \\
&\quad + \sum_{j \neq j'} Q_{mj} Q_{mj'} (\rho_{jj'} \sigma_j \sigma_{j'} + \mu_j \mu_{j'}) \\
&= \sum_{j=1}^J Q_{mj} + \sum_{j=1}^J (Q_{mj}^2 - Q_{mj})(\sigma_j^2 + \mu_j^2) \\
&\quad + \sum_{j \neq j'} Q_{mj} Q_{mj'} (\rho_{jj'} \sigma_j \sigma_{j'} + \mu_j \mu_{j'}).
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, take the unconditional expectation to get

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E} [Z_m^2] &= \sum_{j=1}^J x_{mj} + \sum_{j=1}^J (x_{mj}^2 + x_{mj} - x_{mj})(\sigma_j^2 + \mu_j^2) \\
&\quad + \sum_{j \neq j'} x_{mj} x_{mj'} (\rho_{jj'} \sigma_j \sigma_{j'} + \mu_j \mu_{j'}) \\
&= \underbrace{\sum_{j=1}^J x_{mj}}_{=\mathbf{x}_m^\top \mathbf{1}} \\
&\quad + \underbrace{\sum_{j=1}^J x_{mj}^2 (\sigma_j^2 + \mu_j^2) + \sum_{j \neq j'} x_{mj} x_{mj'} (\rho_{jj'} \sigma_j \sigma_{j'} + \mu_j \mu_{j'})}_{=\mathbf{x}_m^\top (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top) \mathbf{x}_m}. \quad \square
\end{aligned}$$

Proof of Proposition 1. Given the optimal supply (5), the market-clearing conditions (2) become

$$\frac{M}{\gamma} (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top)^{-1} \left(s - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{1} \right) = (\lambda_1(s_1), \dots, \lambda_J(s_J))^\top. \quad (\text{D.1})$$

We now show the existence and the uniqueness of a solution s to (D.1).

Existence: Notice that a solution to (D.1) is equivalent to a fixed point of the function

$$G(s) = \frac{\gamma}{M} (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top) (\lambda_1(s_1), \dots, \lambda_J(s_J))^\top + \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{1}.$$

Because each $\lambda_j(\cdot)$ is nonincreasing and nonnegative, the range of $(\lambda_1(s_1), \dots, \lambda_J(s_J))^\top$ is the compact, convex set $\prod_{j=1}^J [0, \lambda_j(0)]$. The

range of $G(s)$ is a linear transformation of that set, so is also compact and convex. Moreover, G is continuous. It therefore follows from Brouwer's fixed-point theorem that G has a fixed point, and hence that (D.1) has a solution.

Uniqueness: Suppose there are two solutions to (D.1), denoted by s and $s' = s + \delta$, where the vector $\delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_J)^\top$ is the difference of the two solutions. For notational simplicity, write λ as the right-hand side of (D.1) under s and λ' for that under s' . Difference the two market-clearing conditions and then left-multiply both sides with $\delta^\top$ to get

$$\delta^\top \left(\frac{M}{\gamma} (\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top)^{-1} \right) \delta = \delta^\top (\lambda' - \lambda),$$

where if $\delta \neq \mathbf{0}$, the left-hand side is positive, because $(\boldsymbol{\Sigma} + \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mu}^\top)^{-1}$ is positive-definite. Suppose $\delta_j > 0$ (< 0). Then, since the demand functions are monotonically weakly decreasing, $\lambda_j(s_j + \delta_j) - \lambda_j(s_j) \leq 0$ (≥ 0), and the right-hand side above is weakly negative. Therefore, the two solutions s and s' must collapse with $\delta = \mathbf{0}$. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 2. We consider the three cases of $\alpha = 1$, $\alpha = 0$, and $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ separately, following conditions (7a)–(7b).

Consider first the case of $\alpha = 1$. Then Proposition 1 applies with $\lambda_1(s_1) = \lambda_I(s_1)$, $\lambda_2(s_2) = \lambda_R(s_2)$, and weighting matrix $F(1)$. To verify that this outcome satisfies the notion of equilibrium defined in Section 3.1, it remains only to check (7b), which requires $s_1 \geq s_2$. Recall that the demand $\lambda_k(s)$ exhibits a kink at $s = \zeta$. We then have three subcases depending on the ranking of s_1 , s_2 , and ζ .

- If $\zeta > s_1 \geq s_2$, then $\lambda_1(s_1) = (\zeta - s_1)\omega_I$ and $\lambda_2(s_2) = (\zeta - s_2)\omega_R$. Jointly solving the two market-clearing conditions $Mx_{mj} = \lambda_j(s_j)$ for s_1 and s_2 , we obtain $s_j = \frac{\zeta}{2} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\zeta}{2} \right) \beta_j$, where

$$\beta_1 = \frac{(\sigma_I^2 \omega_I + \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_R) \gamma M + (1 - \rho^2) \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R^2 \gamma^2 \omega_I \omega_R}{M^2 + (\sigma_I^2 \omega_I + \sigma_R^2 \omega_R) \gamma M + (1 - \rho^2) \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R^2 \gamma^2 \omega_I \omega_R}; \text{ and } \quad (\text{D.2})$$

$$\beta_2 = \frac{(\sigma_R^2 \omega_R + \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_I) \gamma M + (1 - \rho^2) \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R^2 \gamma^2 \omega_I \omega_R}{M^2 + (\sigma_I^2 \omega_I + \sigma_R^2 \omega_R) \gamma M + (1 - \rho^2) \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R^2 \gamma^2 \omega_I \omega_R}. \quad (\text{D.3})$$

It can be seen that $\zeta > s_1$ (equivalently, $1 > \beta_1$) is satisfied if and only if (12) holds. In addition, $s_1 \geq s_2$ (equivalently, $\beta_1 \geq \beta_2$) is satisfied if and only if $\Delta \leq 0$.

- If $s_1 \geq \zeta > s_2$, then $\lambda_1(s_1) = 0$ and $\lambda_2(s_2) = (\zeta - s_2)\omega_R$. The market-clearing conditions then yield $s_j = \frac{\zeta}{2} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\zeta}{2} \right) \beta_j$, where

$$\beta_1 = \frac{\rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_R \gamma}{M + \sigma_R^2 \omega_R \gamma} \text{ and } \beta_2 = \frac{\sigma_R^2 \omega_R \gamma}{M + \sigma_R^2 \omega_R \gamma}.$$

This solution is consistent with $s_1 \geq \zeta > s_2$ (equivalently, $\beta_1 \geq 1 > \beta_2$) if and only if (12) fails. We also note that the failure of (12) necessarily implies $\Delta < 0$. To see this, suppose the opposite is true, i.e., (12) fails and that $(\sigma_R^2 \omega_R + \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_I) - (\sigma_I^2 \omega_I + \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_R) \geq 0$, the latter implying

$$\begin{aligned}
&(-\sigma_I^2 + \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R) \omega_I \geq (\rho \sigma_I - \sigma_R) \sigma_R \omega_R \\
&\implies \rho \geq \frac{(\rho \sigma_I - \sigma_R) \omega_R}{\sigma_I \omega_I} + \frac{\sigma_I}{\sigma_R}.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that for (12) to fail, we must have $\rho \sigma_I > \sigma_R$, for otherwise the right-hand side of (12) is weakly negative, which would mean that (12) must hold, because $M > 0$. It then follows that $\rho \sigma_I - \sigma_R > 0$ and $\sigma_R < \rho \sigma_I < \sigma_I \implies \frac{\sigma_I}{\sigma_R} > 1$. Therefore, we obtain from the above inequality that $\rho > 1$, a contradiction.

- Finally, if $s_1 \geq s_2 \geq \zeta$, then $\lambda_1(s_1) = \lambda_2(s_2) = 0$. But then using the optimal demand (5), market clearing requires $s_1 = s_2 = \frac{\zeta}{2} < \zeta$. Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium.

Hence, there is an equilibrium with $\alpha = 1$ if and only if $\Delta \leq 0$. Furthermore, this equilibrium is such that $s_1 < \zeta$ if and only if (12) also holds.

Next, suppose $\alpha = 0$. Then Proposition 1 applies with $\lambda_1(s_1) = \lambda_I(s_1) + \lambda_R(s_1)$, $\lambda_2(s_2) = 0$, and weighting matrix $F(0)$. To verify that this outcome satisfies the notion of equilibrium defined in Section 3.1, it remains only to check (7a), which requires $s_1 \leq s_2$. Because there is no demand in $j = 2$ in this case, we only need to discuss two subcases.

- If $s_1 < \zeta$, then $\lambda_1(s_1) = (\zeta - s_1)(\omega_I + \omega_R)$ and $\lambda_2(s_2) = 0$. By market clearing, we obtain $s_j = \frac{\gamma}{2} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right)\beta_j$, where

$$\beta_1 = \frac{(\sigma_I^2 \omega_I^2 + 2\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_I\omega_R + \sigma_R^2 \omega_R^2)\gamma}{M(\omega_I + \omega_R) + (\sigma_I^2 \omega_I^2 + 2\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_I\omega_R + \sigma_R^2 \omega_R^2)\gamma}; \text{ and } \quad (\text{D.4})$$

$$\beta_2 = \frac{(\rho\sigma_I\omega_I\sigma_R + \sigma_R\omega_R^2)(\omega_I + \omega_R)\gamma}{M(\omega_I + \omega_R) + (\sigma_I^2 \omega_I^2 + 2\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_I\omega_R + \sigma_R^2 \omega_R^2)\gamma}.$$

Note that $\beta_1 < 1$ must hold, which guarantees $s_1 < \zeta$. Also, $s_1 \leq s_2$ (equivalently, $\beta_1 \leq \beta_2$) is satisfied if and only if $\Delta \geq 0$.

- If $s_1 \geq \zeta$, then $\lambda_1(s_1) = \lambda_2(s_2) = 0$. But then market clearing requires $s_1 = s_2 = \frac{\gamma}{2} < \zeta$. Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium.

Hence, there is an equilibrium with $\alpha = 0$ if and only if $\Delta \geq 0$.

Finally, suppose $\alpha \in (0, 1)$. Then Proposition 1 applies with $\lambda_1(s_1) = \lambda_I(s_1) + (1 - \alpha)\lambda_R(s_1)$, $\lambda_2(s_2) = \alpha\lambda_R(s_2)$, and weighting matrix $F(\alpha)$. To verify that this outcome satisfies the notion of equilibrium defined in Section 3.1, it remains only to check (7a) and (7b), which jointly require $s_1 = s_2 = s$. There are then two subcases.

- If $s < \zeta$, then $\lambda_1(s) = (\zeta - s)(\omega_I + (1 - \alpha)\omega_R)$ and $\lambda_2(s) = (\zeta - s)\alpha\omega_R$. The two remaining unknowns s and α are pinned down by the market-clearing conditions, which yield $s = \frac{\gamma}{2} + (\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2})\beta$ with

$$\beta = \frac{(1 - \rho^2)\sigma_I^2\sigma_R^2(\omega_I + \omega_R)\gamma}{M(\sigma_I^2 - 2\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R + \sigma_R^2) + (1 - \rho^2)\sigma_I^2\sigma_R^2(\omega_I + \omega_R)\gamma};$$

and for α :

$$(\omega_I + \omega_R - \alpha\omega_R) \times \left[\underbrace{(\sigma_R^2\omega_R + \rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_I) - (\sigma_I^2\omega_I + \rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_R)}_{=\Delta} \right] = 0,$$

which, for any $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, holds if and only if $\Delta = 0$. Note that $\beta < 1$ must hold, which guarantees $s < \zeta$.

- If $s \geq \zeta$, then $\lambda_1(s) = \lambda_2(s) = 0$. But then market clearing requires $s = \frac{\gamma}{2} < \zeta$. Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium.

Hence, for any $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, there is a corresponding equilibrium if and only if $\Delta = 0$. $\square$

Proof of Corollary 1. A segmentation ban exogenously forces $\alpha = 0$. Then Proposition 1 applies, with $\lambda_1(s_b) = \lambda_I(s_b) + \lambda_R(s_b)$, $\lambda_2(s) = 0$, and weighting matrix $F(0)$. Although this completes the proof, it is useful for subsequent proofs to derive an expression for s_b , the spread prevailing in this equilibrium. We conjecture (and subsequently verify) that $s_b < \zeta$. Under this conjecture, liquidity demand is $\lambda_1(s_b) = (\zeta - s_b)(\omega_I + \omega_R)$, so that market-clearing implies $s_b = \frac{\gamma}{2} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right)\beta_b$, where β_b has the same expression as (D.4). Note that $\beta_b < 1$ must hold, which guarantees $s_b < \zeta$. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 3. Equilibrium involves positive volume on-exchange, i.e., $\int_0^M x_{m1} dm > 0$, if and only if $s_1 < \zeta$. And equilibrium involves positive volume off-exchange, i.e., $\int_0^M x_{m2} dm > 0$, if and only

if both $\alpha > 0$ and $s_2 < \zeta$. According to Proposition 2, there is a unique equilibrium involving $\alpha > 0$ if and only if $\Delta < 0$. The proof of Proposition 2 establishes that when $\Delta < 0$, the equilibrium is guaranteed to feature $s_2 < \zeta$. Finally, the proof of Proposition 2 additionally establishes that this equilibrium also features $s_1 < \zeta$ if and only if (12) also holds. $\square$

Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the average demand curve. With segmentation, $\bar{s}$ as defined in (13) can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{s} &= \zeta - \frac{\lambda_I(s_1)^2/\omega_I + \lambda_R(s_2)^2/\omega_R}{\lambda_I(s_1) + \lambda_R(s_2)} \\ &= \zeta - \frac{(Mx_{m1})^2/\omega_I + (Mx_{m2})^2/\omega_R}{Mx_{m1} + Mx_{m2}} \\ &= \zeta - \left(\frac{(1 - f_R)^2}{\omega_I} + \frac{f_R^2}{\omega_R} \right) x, \end{aligned}$$

where the first equality follows from the individual liquidity demand curves of the two investor types: $\lambda_I(s_1) = (\zeta - s_1)\omega_I$ and $\lambda_R(s_2) = (\zeta - s_2)\omega_R$; the second equality follows from market clearing; and the third equality uses $f_R := \frac{x_{m2}}{x_{m2} + x_{m1}}$ and $x := (x_{m1} + x_{m2})M$. The expression also applies when segmentation is banned, in which case $f_R = \frac{\omega_R}{\omega_I + \omega_R}$, implying $s_b = \bar{s} = \zeta - x/(\omega_I + \omega_R)$.

Consider next the average supply curve. With segmentation, market makers' equilibrium supply quantities satisfy the first-order conditions to (8):

$$s_1 - \frac{\gamma}{2} - \gamma \cdot (\sigma_I^2 x_{m1} + \rho\sigma_I\sigma_R x_{m2}) = 0; \text{ and}$$

$$s_2 - \frac{\gamma}{2} - \gamma \cdot (\sigma_R^2 x_{m2} + \rho\sigma_I\sigma_R x_{m1}) = 0.$$

Multiply the first with x_{m1} and the second with x_{m2} , add them up, and finally divide the sum by $x_{m1} + x_{m2}$ to get

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{s} &= \frac{x_{m1}s_1 + x_{m2}s_2}{x_{m1} + x_{m2}} \\ &= \frac{\gamma}{2} + \frac{\sigma_I^2 x_{m1}^2 + 2\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R x_{m1}x_{m2} + \sigma_R^2 x_{m2}^2}{x_{m1} + x_{m2}} \gamma \\ &= \frac{\gamma}{2} + \frac{\gamma \text{var}[x_{m1}D_I + x_{m2}D_R]}{x_{m1} + x_{m2}} \\ &= \frac{\gamma}{2} + \left(\frac{\gamma}{M} \text{var}[(1 - f_R)D_I + f_R D_R] \right) x, \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality uses $f_R := \frac{x_{m2}}{x_{m2} + x_{m1}}$ and $x := (x_{m1} + x_{m2})M$. When segmentation is banned, the above expression also applies, with $f_R = \frac{\omega_R}{\omega_I + \omega_R}$. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 4. Under $\Delta < 0$ and under (12), the equilibrium features both on-exchange and off-exchange volume. Hence, following the proofs of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, $s_j = \frac{\gamma}{2} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right)\beta_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2, b\}$, where β_1 , β_2 , and β_b are given by (D.2), (D.3), and (D.4), respectively. Compare first s_b and s_2 . Direct calculation shows that $\text{sign}[s_2 - s_b] = \text{sign}[\beta_2 - \beta_b] = \text{sign}[(\sigma_R^2\omega_R + \rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_I) - (\sigma_I^2\omega_I + \rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_R)]\text{sign}[M + \gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I + \gamma\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_R]$. The first factor is exactly $\text{sign}[\Delta]$, which is negative, as assumed. For the second factor, note that $M + \gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I + \gamma\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_R$ is increasing in ρ . We therefore examine this factor at the minimum value of ρ that is jointly permitted by the assumptions $\Delta < 0$ and (12). To begin, (12) implies no lower bound for ρ (only the upper bound $\rho < \frac{\sigma_R}{\sigma_I} + \frac{M}{\gamma\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_R}$), so it suffices to consider only the implications of $\Delta < 0$. On the one hand, suppose $\Delta < 0$ implies no lower bound for ρ , meaning that $0 \geq \lim_{\rho \rightarrow -1} \Delta(\rho) = (\sigma_I + \sigma_R)(\sigma_I\omega_I - \sigma_R\omega_R)$, and hence $\sigma_I\omega_I - \sigma_R\omega_R \geq 0$. Then $M + \gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I + \gamma\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_R > M + \gamma\sigma_I(\sigma_I\omega_I - \sigma_R\omega_R) > 0$, so that the second factor is positive. On the other hand, suppose $\Delta < 0$ does

imply a lower bound for ρ : $\rho \geq \frac{\sigma_I^2 \omega_I - \sigma_R^2 \omega_R}{(\omega_I - \omega_R) \sigma_I \sigma_R} \geq -1$. Note that this can be the case only if both $\omega_I < \omega_R$ and $\sigma_R \omega_R > \sigma_I \omega_I$. At this constrained lower bound, $M + \gamma \sigma_I^2 \omega_I + \gamma \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_R = M + \gamma (\sigma_I \omega_I + \sigma_R \omega_R) (\sigma_I \omega_I - \sigma_R \omega_R) / (\omega_I - \omega_R) > 0$, so that the second factor is positive. In either case, we conclude $s_2 < s_b$.

Next, compare s_b and s_1 . Direct calculation shows that $\text{sign}[s_1 - s_b] = \text{sign}[\beta_1 - \beta_b] = \text{sign}[-\Delta] \text{sign}[M + \gamma \sigma_R^2 \omega_R + \gamma \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_I]$. Since $\Delta < 0$, it remains to sign the second part. It is negative if and only if $\rho < -(M + \gamma \sigma_R^2 \omega_R) / (\sigma_R \sigma_I \omega_I)$.

Finally, we compare s_b and $\bar{s}$. To do so, we first define $f_R \in [0, 1]$ as the fraction of R -orders in a market maker's portfolio of orders. When segmentation is banned, both investor types pay the same spread, so we have $f_R^{\text{ban}} = \frac{\omega_R}{\omega_R + \omega_I}$. Let $f_R^{\text{no-ban}}$ denote the equilibrium value for f_R when segmentation is allowed. Given that $\Delta < 0$, market makers want to siphon R -orders off-exchange, so that $f_R^{\text{no-ban}} > \frac{\omega_R}{\omega_R + \omega_I}$. Specifically, $f_R^{\text{no-ban}} = \frac{(\zeta - s_2) \omega_R}{(\zeta - s_2) \omega_R + (\zeta - s_1) \omega_I}$, which, following (D.2) and (D.3), becomes

$$f_R^{\text{no-ban}} = \frac{\omega_R + (\sigma_I^2 - \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R) \omega_I \omega_R \gamma / M}{(\omega_I + \omega_R) + (\sigma_I^2 - 2\rho \sigma_I \sigma_R + \sigma_R^2) \omega_I \omega_R \gamma / M}.$$

Let $\bar{s}(f_R)$ denote the volume-weighted average spread as a function of f_R , defined as the intersection of the two curves from Lemma 2: the average liquidity demand curve $\bar{s}(f_R) = \zeta - v(f_R)x$ and the average liquidity supply curve $\bar{s}(f_R) = \frac{\gamma}{2} + c(f_R)x$. Thus, $\bar{s} < s_b$ will follow if we show that $\bar{s}(f_R^{\text{ban}}) > \bar{s}(f_R^{\text{no-ban}})$. To do so, we solve for $\bar{s}(f_R)$, by eliminating the aggregate volume x :

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{s}(f_R) &= \frac{\frac{\gamma}{2} v(f_R) + \zeta c(f_R)}{v(f_R) + c(f_R)} = \frac{\gamma}{2} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) \frac{c(f_R)}{v(f_R) + c(f_R)} \\ &= \frac{\gamma}{2} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) \frac{1}{1 + v(f_R)/c(f_R)}. \end{aligned}$$

As observed in the text (in the two bullet points following Lemma 2), we have both $v(f_R^{\text{ban}}) < v(f_R^{\text{no-ban}})$ and $c(f_R^{\text{ban}}) > c(f_R^{\text{no-ban}})$, which together imply $\bar{s}(f_R^{\text{ban}}) > \bar{s}(f_R^{\text{no-ban}})$, as desired. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 5. Under $\Delta < 0$ and under (12), the equilibrium features both on-exchange and off-exchange volume. Hence, following the proof of Proposition 2, $s_j = \frac{\gamma}{2} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) \beta_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, where β_1 and β_2 are given by (D.2) and (D.3), respectively. Hence, $\text{sign} \left[\frac{ds_2}{d\omega_R} \right] = \text{sign} \left[\frac{d\beta_2}{d\omega_R} \right] = \text{sign} [M + (\sigma_I^2 - \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R) \gamma \omega_I]$. Using (12), we have $\text{sign} [M + (\sigma_I^2 - \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R) \gamma \omega_I] \geq \text{sign} [\sigma_I^2 \omega_I - (\omega_I - \omega_R) \sigma_I \sigma_R \rho - \sigma_R^2 \omega_R] = \text{sign} [-\Delta] > 0$. Therefore, $\frac{ds_2}{d\omega_R} > 0$.

Likewise,

$$\text{sign} \left[\frac{ds_1}{d\omega_R} \right] = \text{sign} \left[\frac{d\beta_1}{d\omega_R} \right] = \text{sign} [\rho] \text{sign} [M + (\sigma_I^2 - \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R) \gamma \omega_R].$$

The second factor was shown to be positive above. Hence, $\text{sign} \left[\frac{ds_1}{d\omega_R} \right] = \text{sign} [\rho]$.

Finally, $\text{sign} \left[\frac{d(s_1 - s_2)}{d\omega_R} \right] = \text{sign} \left[\frac{d(\beta_1 - \beta_2)}{d\omega_R} \right] = \text{sign} [\gamma \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R \omega_I \rho^2 + M \sigma_I \rho - (M + \gamma \sigma_I^2 \omega_I) \sigma_R]$. This quadratic expression in $\rho \in [-1, 1]$ is convex, is strictly negative at $\rho = 0$, and is strictly increasing at $\rho = 0$. Note also that at $\rho = -1$, it becomes $-(\sigma_I + \sigma_R)M < 0$, implying that $\frac{d(s_1 - s_2)}{d\omega_R} < 0$ for all $\rho \in [-1, 0]$. Therefore, there exists a unique threshold $\hat{\rho} > 0$,

$$\hat{\rho} = \frac{1}{2\gamma \sigma_I \sigma_R \omega_I} \left(-M + \sqrt{M^2 + 4M\gamma \sigma_R^2 \omega_I + 4\gamma^2 \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R^2 \omega_I^2} \right), \quad (\text{D.5})$$

which is the positive root of the above quadratic expression, such that $\frac{d(s_1 - s_2)}{d\omega_R} > 0$ for $\rho > \hat{\rho}$. (Note that the threshold $\hat{\rho}$ may or may not lie within the domain of ρ , i.e., $\hat{\rho}$ can be ≤ 1 .) In summary, the necessary and sufficient condition for $\frac{d(s_1 - s_2)}{d\omega_R} < 0$ is $\rho < \hat{\rho}$. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 6. Under $\Delta < 0$ and under (12), the equilibrium features both on-exchange and off-exchange volume. Hence, following the proof of Proposition 2, $s_j = \frac{\gamma}{2} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) \beta_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, where β_1 and β_2 are given by (D.2) and (D.3), respectively. Hence, $\text{sign} \left[\frac{ds_1}{dM} \right] = \text{sign} \left[\frac{d\beta_1}{dM} \right] = \text{sign} \left[(1 - \rho^2) (\rho \sigma_I - \sigma_R) \sigma_I \sigma_R^3 \omega_I \omega_R^2 \gamma^2 - 2(1 - \rho^2) M \gamma \sigma_I \sigma_R^2 \omega_I \omega_R - (\sigma_I \omega_I + \rho \sigma_R \omega_R) M^2 \right]$. That is, we need to evaluate the sign of this quadratic expression in M . There are two cases, depending on whether M is constrained by (12).

- Suppose (12) is not binding, i.e., $\rho \sigma_I \sigma_R - \sigma_R^2 \leq 0$. First, we note that this implies that the intercept of the quadratic expression is negative. Second, we show that the quadratic expression in M must be (weakly) concave. To do so, we assume the opposite, i.e., the coefficient on M^2 is positive, i.e., $\sigma_I \omega_I + \rho \sigma_R \omega_R < 0$. Next, $\Delta < 0$ implies, after some rearranging, that $(\sigma_R \omega_R + \rho \sigma_I \omega_I) \sigma_R < (\sigma_I \omega_I + \rho \sigma_R \omega_R) \sigma_I$. Hence, $\sigma_R \omega_R + \rho \sigma_I \omega_I < 0$. Summing $\sigma_I \omega_I + \rho \sigma_R \omega_R < 0$ and $\sigma_R \omega_R + \rho \sigma_I \omega_I < 0$ implies that $(1 + \rho)(\sigma_I \omega_I + \sigma_R \omega_R) < 0$, which is a contradiction because $\rho > -1$. Third, in the limit of $M \rightarrow 0$, the slope of the quadratic expression is negative.
- Suppose (12) is binding, i.e., $\rho \sigma_I \sigma_R - \sigma_R^2 > 0$. First, we note that this implies $\rho > 0$ and, hence, the coefficient on M^2 in the above quadratic expression is strictly negative. Second, just as in the previous case, the slope of the quadratic expression is negative at $M = 0$. Note, however, that the relevant domain for M is now bounded away from 0; rather, (12) implies $M > (\rho \sigma_I \sigma_R - \sigma_R^2) \omega_R \gamma$. Third, in the limit as $M \rightarrow (\rho \sigma_I \sigma_R - \sigma_R^2) \omega_R \gamma$, the quadratic expression evaluates to $\gamma^3 \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R (\rho \sigma_I \sigma_R - \sigma_R^2) \omega_R^2 \Delta < 0$.

Summing up, in either case, the quadratic expression above is negative for all M on the relevant domain. Therefore, β_1 (hence also s_1) is always decreasing in M .

Likewise, $\text{sign} \left[\frac{ds_2}{dM} \right] = \text{sign} \left[\frac{d\beta_2}{dM} \right]$. We first show that β_2 is quasi-convex in M . Direct evaluation shows

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d\beta_2}{dM} &= \frac{\gamma \sigma_R}{h(M)} \left(-(1 - \rho^2) (\sigma_I - \rho \sigma_R) \sigma_I^3 \sigma_R \omega_I^2 \omega_R \gamma^2 \right. \\ &\quad \left. - 2(1 - \rho^2) \gamma \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R \omega_I \omega_R M - (\rho \sigma_I \omega_I + \sigma_R \omega_R) M^2 \right), \end{aligned}$$

where $h(M)$ is some strictly positive 4th-order polynomial in M , not affecting the sign of $\frac{d\beta_2}{dM}$. Consider a stationary point denoted by M^* . We have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d^2 \beta_2}{dM^2} \Big|_{M=M^*} &= \frac{2\gamma \sigma_R}{h(M^*)} \left(-(1 - \rho^2) \gamma \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R \omega_I \omega_R - (\rho \sigma_I \omega_I + \sigma_R \omega_R) M^* \right) \\ &= \frac{2\gamma^2 (1 - \rho^2)}{h(M^*) M^*} \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R^2 \omega_I \omega_R (M^* + \gamma (\sigma_I^2 - \rho \sigma_I \sigma_R) \omega_I) \\ &> \frac{2\gamma^2 (1 - \rho^2)}{h(M^*) M^*} \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R^2 \omega_I \omega_R \cdot (-\gamma \Delta) > 0, \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality follows from $\frac{d\beta_2}{dM} \Big|_{M=M^*} = 0$ by substituting $(\rho \sigma_I \omega_I + \sigma_R \omega_R) M^* = -\frac{1}{M^*} (1 - \rho^2) (\sigma_I - \rho \sigma_R) \sigma_I^3 \sigma_R \omega_I^2 \omega_R \gamma^2 - 2(1 - \rho^2) \gamma \sigma_I^2 \sigma_R \omega_I \omega_R$, the first inequality follows from (12), and the second inequality follows from $\Delta < 0$. That is, at all stationary points (if any exist), β_2 is strictly convex, and, hence, β_2 is quasi-convex on the domain $M > 0$. We then examine the limits of β_2 . Direct computation shows that if M is not constrained by (12), $\lim_{M \downarrow 0} \beta_2 = 1$; that if M is constrained by (12), $\lim_{M \downarrow (\rho \sigma_I \sigma_R - \sigma_R^2) \omega_R \gamma} \beta_2 = \frac{\sigma_R}{\rho \sigma_I}$ (note that $\rho > 0$ in this case); and that $\lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \beta_2 = 0$. That is, the left limit of β_2 , irrespective of whether M is constrained, is always strictly larger than its right limit. Together with the quasi-convexity, it follows that β_2 (hence also s_2) is either monotonically decreasing or U-shaped in M ,

depending on $\lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \text{sign} \left[\frac{d\beta_2}{dM} \right]$. Since $\text{sign} \left[\frac{d\beta_2}{dM} \right] = \text{sign} \left[M^2 \frac{d\beta_2}{dM} \right]$, we directly compute $\lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \text{sign} \left[M^2 \frac{d\beta_2}{dM} \right] = \text{sign} [-(\rho\sigma_I\omega_I + \sigma_R\omega_R)]$, recalling that $h(M)$ is a 4th-order polynomial in M . Therefore, if $\rho < -\frac{\sigma_R\omega_R}{\sigma_I\omega_I}$, then the off-exchange spread s_2 is U-shaped in M ; or else, s_2 is also monotonically decreasing in M . $\square$

Proof of Proposition 7. We first derive a market maker's equilibrium expected profit π without the ban and π_b with the ban. To do so, we calculate market makers' aggregate surplus as the area of the triangle, in a supply-demand graph, formed by the vertical (price) axis, the aggregate supply in marketplace j , and the horizontal line at s_j . The per capita surplus, therefore, amounts to $\frac{1}{2M} \left(s_j - \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) (\zeta - s_j) \omega_j$, where $\omega_j = \omega_I$ if $j = 1$, $\omega_j = \omega_R$ if $j = 2$, and $\omega_j = (\omega_I + \omega_R)$ if $j = b$. We then further plug in $s_j = \frac{\gamma}{2} + (\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2})\beta_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2, b\}$, where the equilibrium values for β_1 , β_2 , and β_b are given by (D.2), (D.3), and (D.4), respectively. This gives $\pi = \frac{(\zeta - \gamma/2)^2}{2M} ((1 - \beta_1)\beta_1\omega_I + (1 - \beta_2)\beta_2\omega_R)$; and $\pi_b = \frac{(\zeta - \gamma/2)^2}{2M} (\omega_I + \omega_R)(1 - \beta_b)\beta_b$. Directly evaluating $\pi - \pi_b$ yields that $\text{sign}[\pi - \pi_b]$ is equivalent to the sign of the following cubic polynomial in M :

$$\begin{aligned} & \underbrace{-2(\omega_I + \omega_R) M^3}_{<0} \\ & + \underbrace{(2\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_I\omega_R + \sigma_I^2\omega_I(2\omega_I + \omega_R) + \sigma_R^2\omega_R(\omega_I + 2\omega_R))\gamma M^2}_{>0} \\ & + \underbrace{\gamma^3(1 - \rho^2)\sigma_I^2\sigma_R^2\omega_I\omega_R(2\rho\sigma_I\sigma_R\omega_I\omega_R + \sigma_I^2\omega_I^2 + \sigma_R^2\omega_R^2)}_{>0}. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{D.6})$$

Clearly, its derivative is a concave quadratic function of M , with one strictly negative root and the other root at zero. That is, for all $M > 0$, the cubic expression is strictly decreasing in M . Since the intercept is positive, the cubic polynomial always has a unique positive root $\hat{M} > 0$. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 8. Under $\Delta < 0$ and under (12), the equilibrium without a segmentation ban involves all R -orders being siphoned off-exchange, as well as positive volume both on-exchange and off-exchange. Hence, (x_I, x_R, s_I, s_R) are characterized by the following two conditions, which respectively capture market maker optimization (following (5)) and market-clearing:

$$\begin{pmatrix} x_I \\ x_R \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \Sigma_0^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} s_I - \frac{\gamma}{2} \\ s_R - \frac{\gamma}{2} \end{pmatrix} \quad M \begin{pmatrix} x_I \\ x_R \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} (\zeta - s_I)\omega_I \\ (\zeta - s_R)\omega_R \end{pmatrix}.$$

Eliminating (s_I, s_R) , we obtain a condition involving x_I and x_R only:

$$\gamma \Sigma_0 \begin{pmatrix} x_I \\ x_R \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{M}{\omega_I} x_I \\ \zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{M}{\omega_R} x_R \end{pmatrix}.$$

It is straightforward to verify that this condition coincides with the first-order conditions of the expression for welfare given by (14). Because (14) is concave, it follows that, as claimed in the text, the equilibrium without a segmentation ban leads to the welfare-maximizing choices of (x_I, x_R) . It follows trivially that $w_b < w$. $\square$

Proof of Lemma 3. We first derive the posterior order flow characteristics in each marketplace j . In equilibrium, a fraction $\alpha^{(2)} \in [0, 1]$ of R -orders are siphoned off-exchange. Hence, $D_2^{(2)} = D_R^{(2)} = 0$ as all off-exchange orders are R -type, and $D_1^{(2)} = w_I^{(2)} D_I^{(2)} + (1 - w_I^{(2)}) D_R^{(2)} = w_I^{(2)} D_I^{(2)}$, where $w_I^{(2)} := \frac{\omega_I}{\omega_I + (1 - \alpha^{(2)})\omega_R}$ is the relative weight of I -

orders on-exchange. Given $\mathbb{E}_1[D_I^{(2)}] = \phi_I D_I^{(1)}$, $\text{var}_1[D_I^{(2)}] = (1 - \phi_I^2)\sigma_I^2$, $\mathbb{E}_1[D_R^{(2)}] = 0$, and $\text{var}_1[D_R^{(2)}] = 0$, we obtain³¹

$$\mu^{(2|1)} = \begin{pmatrix} w_I^{(2)} \phi_I D_I^{(1)} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \text{ and } \Sigma^{(2|1)} = \begin{pmatrix} (w_I^{(2)})^2 (1 - \phi_I^2) \sigma_I^2 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (\text{D.7})$$

Next, we derive the objective function (C.2) of a market maker m , who enters period 2 with inventory $z_m^{(1)}$. Suppose her liquidity supply is $\mathbf{x}_m^{(2)} = (x_{m1}^{(2)}, x_{m2}^{(2)})^\top$. Then her number of trades $Q_{mj}^{(2)}$ in each marketplace j is Poisson distributed with expectation $x_{mj}^{(2)}$. Her expected spread revenue from marketplace j remains $\mathbb{E}_1[Q_{mj}^{(2)} s_j^{(2)}] = x_{mj}^{(2)} s_j^{(2)}$. Denote her inventory from marketplace j by $z_{mj}^{(2)}$. At the beginning of period 2, her expectation of her terminal squared inventory is $\mathbb{E}_1 \left[(z_m^{(1)} + \sum_{j=1}^2 z_{mj}^{(2)})^2 \right] = (z_m^{(1)})^2 + 2z_m^{(1)} \mathbb{E}_1 \left[\sum_{j=1}^2 z_{mj}^{(2)} \right] + \mathbb{E}_1 \left[(\sum_{j=1}^2 z_{mj}^{(2)})^2 \right]$. The third term, following Lemma 1, is

$$\mathbb{E}_1 \left[\left(\sum_{j=1}^2 z_{mj}^{(2)} \right)^2 \right] = \mathbf{x}_m^{(2)\top} \mathbf{1} + \mathbf{x}_m^{(2)\top} \left(\Sigma^{(2|1)} + \mu^{(2|1)} \mu^{(2|1)\top} \right) \mathbf{x}_m^{(2)}.$$

Directly evaluating the expectation in the second term yields

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_1 \left[\sum_{j=1}^2 z_{mj}^{(2)} \right] &= \sum_{j=1}^2 \mathbb{E}_1 \left[\mathbb{E}_1 \left[z_{mj}^{(2)} | Q_{mj}^{(2)} \right] \right] \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^2 \mathbb{E}_1 \left[\mathbb{E}_1 \left[\sum_{i=1}^{Q_{mj}^{(2)}} (-1)^{B_{mji}} \right] \right] \\ &= - \sum_{j=1}^2 \mathbb{E}_1 \left[\mathbb{E}_1 \left[Q_{mj}^{(2)} D_j^{(2)} \right] \right] = - \sum_{j=1}^2 x_{mj}^{(2)} \mu^{(2|1)} \\ &= - \mathbf{x}_m^{(2)\top} \mu^{(2|1)}, \end{aligned}$$

where $(B_{mji})_{i=1}^{Q_{mj}^{(2)}}$ are i.i.d. Bernoulli draws with success rate $\frac{1}{2}(1 + D_j^{(2)})$. Combining the above results, we obtain the objective $\pi_m^{(2)}$ as given in (C.2).

The first-order condition regarding $x_{m1}^{(2)}$ uniquely solves the optimal $x_{m1}^{(2)}$ (and the second-order condition clearly holds):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d\pi_m^{(2)}}{dx_{m1}^{(2)}} &= s_1^{(2)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} + w_I^{(2)} \gamma \phi_I D_I^{(1)} z_m^{(1)} - \gamma (w_I^{(2)} \sigma_I)^2 x_{m1}^{(2)} = 0 \\ \Rightarrow x_{m1}^{(2)} &= \frac{s_1^{(2)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} + w_I^{(2)} \gamma \phi_I D_I^{(1)} z_m^{(1)}}{\gamma (w_I^{(2)} \sigma_I)^2}. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{D.8})$$

However, $\frac{d\pi_m^{(2)}}{dx_{m2}^{(2)}} = s_2^{(2)} - \frac{\gamma}{2}$ does not depend on $\mathbf{x}_m^{(2)}$; in other words, the objective $\pi_m^{(2)}$ is linear in $x_{m2}^{(2)}$. Therefore, to satisfy the first-order condition $\frac{d\pi_m^{(2)}}{dx_{m2}^{(2)}} = 0$, the equilibrium off-exchange half spread must be

$$s_2^{(2)} = \frac{\gamma}{2}. \quad (\text{D.9})$$

The on-exchange market-clearing condition is $\int_0^M x_{m1}^{(2)} dm = \lambda_I (s_1^{(2)}) + (1 - \alpha^{(2)}) \lambda_R (s_1^{(2)})$, or

³¹ Note that, because we assume $D_R^{(2)} = 0$ is a constant, $\text{var}[D_R^{(2)}] = 0$, and $(\Sigma^{(2|1)} + \mu^{(2|1)} \mu^{(2|1)\top})$ is no longer invertible. Hence, unlike in (5), for example, an individual market maker's optimal liquidity supply $\mathbf{x}_m^{(2)}$ cannot be uniquely determined. Nevertheless, as the proof shows below, the on-exchange liquidity supply, the aggregate off-exchange liquidity supply, and the half spreads $s^{(2)}$ all remain unique in equilibrium.

$$\frac{M}{\gamma(w_I^{(2)}\sigma_I)^2} \left(s_1^{(2)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} + w_I^{(2)}\gamma\phi_I D_I^{(1)}\bar{z}^{(1)} \right) = \max\{0, \zeta - s_1^{(2)}\} \frac{\omega_I}{w_I^{(2)}},$$

using (D.8) and $\lambda_k(s) = \max\{0, \zeta - s\}\omega_k$. Define

$$\tau^{(2)} := \zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} + \gamma w_I^{(2)}\phi_I D_I^{(1)}\bar{z}^{(1)}.$$

We then obtain the equilibrium on-exchange half spread

$$s_1^{(2)} = \begin{cases} \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{M + 2w_I^{(2)}(\zeta\omega_I\sigma_I^2 - \phi_I D_I^{(1)}\bar{z}^{(1)}M)}{M + w_I^{(2)}\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2} & \text{if } \tau^{(2)} > 0; \\ \frac{\gamma}{2} \left(1 - 2w_I^{(2)}\phi_I D_I^{(1)}\bar{z}^{(1)} \right) & \text{if } \tau^{(2)} \leq 0. \end{cases} \quad (\text{D.10})$$

Plugging (D.10) into (D.8), an individual market maker m 's equilibrium on-exchange supply is

$$x_{m1}^{(2)} = \begin{cases} \frac{\left(\frac{z_m^{(1)} - \bar{z}^{(1)}}{M} \phi_I D_I^{(1)} + \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} + w_I^{(2)}\gamma\phi_I D_I^{(1)}\bar{z}^{(1)} \right) \sigma_I^2 \omega_I \right)}{M w_I^{(2)} \sigma_I^2 + \gamma \left(w_I^{(2)} \sigma_I^2 \right)^2 \omega_I} & \text{if } \tau^{(2)} > 0; \\ \frac{1}{w_I^{(2)} \sigma_I^2} \left(z_m^{(1)} - \bar{z}^{(1)} \right) \phi_I D_I^{(1)} & \text{if } \tau^{(2)} \leq 0. \end{cases} \quad (\text{D.11})$$

Similarly, the off-exchange market-clearing condition is $\int_0^M x_{m2}^{(2)} dm = \alpha^{(2)} \lambda_R(s_2^{(2)})$. Using (D.9), we obtain the equilibrium aggregate off-exchange liquidity supply

$$\int_0^M x_{m2}^{(2)} dm = \alpha^{(2)} \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) \omega_R. \quad (\text{D.12})$$

The best-execution requirement says that if $s_2^{(2)} < (>) s_1^{(2)}$, then all (no) R -orders are siphoned off-exchange, i.e., $\alpha^{(2)} = 1$ ($=0$). If $s_2^{(2)} = s_1^{(2)}$, then $\alpha^{(2)}$ can take any value in $[0, 1]$. Recall the definition of $\Delta^{(2)}$ from (C.3). On the one hand, if $\tau^{(2)} > 0$, then using the spread expressions (D.9) and (D.10) (the $\tau^{(2)} > 0$ case), we have

$$\tau^{(2)} > 0 \implies \begin{cases} s_2^{(2)} < s_1^{(2)} \iff w_I^{(2)}\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2 < 2w_I^{(2)} \left(\zeta\omega_I\sigma_I^2 - \phi_I D_I^{(1)}\bar{z}^{(1)}M \right) \iff \Delta^{(2)} < 0; \\ s_2^{(2)} > s_1^{(2)} \iff w_I^{(2)}\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2 > 2w_I^{(2)} \left(\zeta\omega_I\sigma_I^2 - \phi_I D_I^{(1)}\bar{z}^{(1)}M \right) \iff \Delta^{(2)} > 0. \end{cases} \quad (\text{D.13})$$

(Note that $w_I^{(2)}$ is strictly positive and, hence, can be canceled out without affecting the inequalities above.) On the other hand, if $\tau^{(2)} \leq 0$, then $D_I^{(1)}\bar{z}^{(1)} \leq \frac{1}{\gamma w_I^{(2)}\phi_I} \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) < 0$. Using the spread expressions (D.9) and (D.10) (the $\tau^{(2)} \leq 0$ case), this inequality implies $s_2^{(2)} < s_1^{(2)}$. Recalling (C.3), the same inequality also implies $\Delta^{(2)} < 0$. It follows that we have also the following (with the second case holding vacuously)

$$\tau^{(2)} \leq 0 \implies \begin{cases} s_2^{(2)} < s_1^{(2)} \iff \Delta^{(2)} < 0; \\ s_2^{(2)} > s_1^{(2)} \iff \Delta^{(2)} > 0. \end{cases} \quad (\text{D.14})$$

Combining (D.13) and (D.14) with the best-execution requirement, the relationship between $\Delta^{(2)}$ and $\alpha^{(2)}$ is precisely as stated in the lemma.

Finally, assume market clearing from $t = 1$. Then $\bar{z}^{(1)} = -\frac{1}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) D_I^{(1)}$. Plugging this into (C.3), the expression for $\Delta^{(2)}$ becomes

$$\Delta^{(2)} = -\frac{\phi_I \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) \sigma_I^2}{\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}} - \sigma_I^2 \omega_I,$$

which is negative. Following the previous paragraph, best-execution therefore requires $\alpha^{(2)} = 1$, and, hence, $w_I^{(2)} = 1$. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 9. The first step is to characterize the order flow characteristics in each marketplace j . Similar to $t = 2$, defining $w_I^{(1)} = \frac{\omega_I}{\omega_I + (1 - \alpha^{(1)})\omega_R}$ as the on-exchange weight of I -orders, we have

$$\mu^{(1)} = \mathbb{E} \begin{bmatrix} D_1^{(1)} \\ D_2^{(1)} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \text{ and}$$

$$\Sigma^{(1)} = \text{var} \begin{bmatrix} D_1^{(1)} \\ D_2^{(1)} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} (w_I^{(1)})^2 \sigma_I^2 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

The second step is to derive the objective function $\pi_m^{(1)} = \mathbf{x}_m^{(1)\top} \mathbf{s}_1^{(1)} + \mathbb{E}[\pi_m^{(2)}(\cdot)]$. In particular, we are only interested in how it is affected by the supply $\mathbf{x}_m^{(1)}$. To do so, we first evaluate $\pi_m^{(2)}(\cdot)$ using the $t = 2$ solution derived above. In particular, recall that under $t = 1$ market clearing, $\Delta^{(2)} < 0$ and so $w_I^{(2)} = 1$. Then plug into (C.2) the half spread $s_2^{(2)}$ as given by (D.9) and the posterior moments (D.7) to get

$$\pi_m^{(2)} = \left(s_1^{(2)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) x_{m1}^{(2)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \left((z_m^{(1)})^2 - 2\phi_I D_I^{(1)} z_m^{(1)} x_{m1}^{(2)} + (x_{m1}^{(2)})^2 \right).$$

To substitute in $s_1^{(2)}$ and $x_{m1}^{(2)}$, we need to discuss two cases.³²

Case 1: Conjecture $\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \leq \frac{\gamma\phi_I\sigma_I^2}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)})$. Given market clearing at $t = 1$, it follows that $\tau^{(2)} \leq 0$:

$$\tau^{(2)} = \zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} + \gamma w_I^{(2)}\phi_I D_I^{(1)}\bar{z}^{(1)} = \zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{\gamma\phi_I\sigma_I^2}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) \leq 0,$$

where the first equality is the definition of $\tau^{(2)}$, and the second equality uses that, as discussed in the proof of Lemma 3, $t = 1$ market clearing implies (i) $\bar{z}^{(1)} = -\frac{1}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) D_I^{(1)}$ and (ii) $w_I^{(2)} = 1$. Substituting the $\tau^{(2)} \leq 0$ cases of (D.10) and (D.11) into $\pi_m^{(2)}$ and then also, by market clearing, substituting $\bar{z}^{(1)} = -\frac{1}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) D_I^{(1)}$ into $\pi_m^{(2)}$, we get

$$\pi_m^{(2)} = -\frac{\gamma}{2} (1 - \phi_I)^2 (z_m^{(1)})^2 + \frac{\gamma}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) \phi_I^2 D_I^{(1)} z_m^{(1)} + [\text{terms unaffected by } \mathbf{x}_m^{(1)}].$$

From the market maker's point of view in $t = 1$, the above involves two random variables: $z_m^{(1)}$ and $D_I^{(1)}$. Recall that $z_m^{(1)} = z_{m1}^{(1)} + z_{m2}^{(1)}$ and, hence, by Lemma 1, $\mathbb{E}[(z_m^{(1)})^2] = \mathbf{x}_m^{(1)\top} \mathbf{1} + \mathbf{x}_m^{(1)\top} (\Sigma^{(1)} + \mu^{(1)} \mu^{(1)\top}) \mathbf{x}_m^{(1)} = x_{m1}^{(1)} + x_{m2}^{(1)} + (w_I^{(1)}\sigma_I)^2 (x_{m1}^{(1)})^2$. Note that $z_m^{(1)}$ and $D_I^{(1)}$ are correlated: $\mathbb{E}[D_I^{(1)} z_m^{(1)}] = \mathbb{E}[D_I^{(1)} z_{m1}^{(1)}] = -w_I^{(1)} x_{m1}^{(1)} \sigma_I^2$. Therefore, taking the unconditional expectation of $\pi_m^{(2)}$ and adding the $t = 1$ spread revenues $\mathbf{x}_m^{(1)\top} \mathbf{s}_1^{(1)}$, we obtain

$$\pi_m^{(1)} = \left(s_1^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} (1 - \phi_I^2) \right) x_{m1}^{(1)} + \left(s_2^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} (1 - \phi_I^2) \right) x_{m2}^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} (1 - \phi_I^2) (w_I^{(1)} x_{m1}^{(1)} \sigma_I)^2 - \frac{\gamma\sigma_I^2\phi_I^2}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) w_I^{(1)} x_{m1}^{(1)} + [\text{terms unaffected by } \mathbf{x}_m^{(1)}].$$

As in the case of $t = 2$, the first-order conditions with respect to $x_{m1}^{(1)}$ and $x_{m2}^{(1)}$ determine

$$x_{m1}^{(1)} = \frac{\left(s_1^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2} (1 - \phi_I^2) \right) M - \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) w_I^{(1)} \gamma \sigma_I^2 \phi_I^2}{(1 - \phi_I^2) (w_I^{(1)} \sigma_I)^2 M \gamma}; \text{ and} \quad (\text{D.15})$$

$$s_2^{(1)} = \frac{\gamma}{2} (1 - \phi_I^2). \quad (\text{D.16})$$

On-exchange market clearing requires $\int_0^M x_{m1}^{(1)} dm = \lambda_I(s_1^{(2)}) + (1 - \alpha^{(1)}) \lambda_R(s_1^{(2)})$, i.e.,

³² The off-exchange liquidity supply $x_{m2}^{(2)}$ is not needed: Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 that the equilibrium off-exchange half spread $s_2^{(2)}$ as given in (D.9) ensures that the off-exchange supply $x_{m2}^{(2)}$ is irrelevant for $\pi_m^{(2)}$.

$$\frac{(s_1^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2))M - \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)})w_I^{(1)}\gamma\sigma_I^2\phi_I^2}{(1 - \phi_I^2)\gamma(w_I^{(1)}\sigma_I)^2} = \max\{0, \zeta - s_1^{(1)}\} \frac{\omega_I}{w_I^{(1)}}.$$

Assuming $\zeta - s_1^{(1)} \leq 0$, then $\lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) = 0$, and the above equation gives $s_1^{(1)} = \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2) \leq \frac{\gamma}{2} < \zeta$, which contradicts the assumption. We conclude that $\zeta > s_1^{(1)}$, in which case $\lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) = (\zeta - s_1^{(1)})\omega_I$ and the above market-clearing condition yields

$$s_1^{(1)} = \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{(1 - \phi_I^2)M + 2w_I^{(1)}\omega_I\sigma_I^2\zeta}{M + w_I^{(1)}\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2}. \quad (\text{D.17})$$

Direct computation gives

$$s_1^{(1)} - s_2^{(1)} = \frac{w_I^{(1)}\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2}{M + w_I^{(1)}\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2} \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2) \right) > 0.$$

Therefore, best-execution requires all R -orders to be siphoned off-exchange in period 1, yielding $\alpha_1^{(1)} = 1$ and $w_I^{(1)} = 1$. Finally, we need to verify the initial conjecture. Using (D.17) (with $w_I^{(1)} = 1$),

$$\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \leq \frac{\gamma\phi_I\sigma_I^2}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) \iff \zeta \leq \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{M + (1 - \phi_I + \phi_I^3)\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2}{M + (1 - \phi_I)\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2},$$

that is, this case applies if and only if the last inequality holds.

Case 2: Conjecture $\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} > \frac{\gamma\phi_I\sigma_I^2}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)})$. Given market clearing at $t = 1$, it follows that $\tau^{(2)} > 0$:

$$\tau^{(2)} = \zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} + \gamma w_I^{(2)} \phi_I D_I^{(1)} \bar{z}^{(1)} = \zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{\gamma\phi_I\sigma_I^2}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) > 0,$$

where the first equality is the definition of $\tau^{(2)}$, and the second equality uses that, as discussed in the proof of Lemma 3, $t = 1$ market clearing implies (i) $\bar{z}^{(1)} = -\frac{1}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) D_I^{(1)}$ and (ii) $w_I^{(2)} = 1$. Substituting the $\tau^{(2)} > 0$ cases of (D.10) and (D.11) into $\pi_m^{(2)}$ and then also, by market clearing, substituting $\bar{z}^{(1)} = -\frac{1}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) D_I^{(1)}$ into $\pi_m^{(2)}$, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_m^{(2)} &= -\frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2)(z_m^{(1)})^2 \\ &\quad + \frac{\left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right)\omega_I + \phi_I \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)})}{M + \gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2} \gamma\phi_I D_I^{(1)} z_m^{(1)} \\ &\quad + [\text{terms unaffected by } x_m^{(1)}]. \end{aligned}$$

As in the previous case, taking the unconditional expectation of $\pi_m^{(2)}$ and adding the $t = 1$ spread revenues $x_m^{(1)\top} s^{(1)}$, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_m^{(1)} &= \left(s_1^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2)\right) x_{m1}^{(1)} \\ &\quad + \left(s_2^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2)\right) x_{m2}^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2)(w_I^{(1)} x_{m1}^{(1)} \sigma_I)^2 \\ &\quad - \frac{\gamma\sigma_I^2\phi_I}{M + \gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I} \left(\left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right)\omega_I + \phi_I \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) \right) w_I^{(1)} x_{m1}^{(1)} \\ &\quad + [\text{terms unaffected by } x_m^{(1)}]. \end{aligned}$$

Then, as before, the first-order conditions pin down

$$x_{m1}^{(1)} = \frac{(s_1^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2))(M + \gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I) - \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)})w_I^{(1)}\gamma\sigma_I^2\phi_I^2 - (\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2})w_I^{(1)}\phi_I\gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I}{(1 - \phi_I^2)(w_I^{(1)}\sigma_I)^2 (M + \gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I)}; \quad \text{and} \quad (\text{D.18})$$

$$s_2^{(1)} = \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2). \quad (\text{D.19})$$

On-exchange market clearing requires $\int_0^M x_{m1}^{(1)} dm = \lambda_I(s_1^{(2)}) + (1 - \alpha^{(1)})\lambda_R(s_1^{(2)})$, i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} M \cdot \frac{(s_1^{(1)} - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2))(M + \gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I) - \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)})w_I^{(1)}\gamma\sigma_I^2\phi_I^2 - (\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2})w_I^{(1)}\phi_I\gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I}{(1 - \phi_I^2)(w_I^{(1)}\sigma_I)^2 (M + \gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I)} \\ = \max\{0, \zeta - s_1^{(1)}\} \frac{\omega_I}{w_I^{(1)}}. \end{aligned}$$

Assuming $\zeta - s_1^{(1)} \leq 0$, then $\lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) = 0$, and the above equation then gives

$$\begin{aligned} s_1^{(1)} - \zeta \\ = \frac{\frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2) \cdot M + \left(\frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2) + \left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}\right)\phi_I w_I^{(1)}\right)\gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I}{M + \gamma\sigma_I^2\omega_I} - \zeta, \end{aligned}$$

which decreases in ζ and, hence, when $\zeta \downarrow \frac{\gamma}{2}$, reaches its maximum of $-\frac{\gamma}{2}\phi_I^2 < 0$, thus rejecting the assumption. We conclude that $\zeta > s_1^{(1)}$, in which case $\lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) = (\zeta - s_1^{(1)})\omega_I$ and the above market-clearing condition yields

$$s_1^{(1)} = \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{(1 - \phi_I^2)(M + \gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2)(M + 2\zeta w_I^{(1)}\omega_I\sigma_I^2) + (2(\phi_I + \phi_I^2)\zeta - \phi_I\gamma)M w_I^{(1)}\omega_I\sigma_I^2}{(M + \gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2)(M + \gamma w_I^{(1)}\omega_I\sigma_I^2) - w_I^{(1)}\phi_I^2\gamma^2\omega_I^2\sigma_I^4}. \quad (\text{D.20})$$

Directly comparing the two half spreads in this case yields

$$\begin{aligned} s_1^{(1)} - s_2^{(2)} \\ = \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{[2(1 + \phi_I)\zeta - \gamma]\phi_I M w_I^{(1)}\omega_I\sigma_I^2 + (1 - \phi_I^2)w_I^{(1)}\phi_I^2\gamma^2\omega_I^2\sigma_I^4}{M^2 + (1 + w_I^{(1)})M\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2 + (1 - \phi_I^2)w_I^{(1)}\gamma^2\omega_I^2\sigma_I^4} \\ > 0, \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality is guaranteed by $\zeta > \frac{\gamma}{2}$. Therefore, best-execution requires all R -orders to be routed off-exchange in period 1, yielding $\alpha^{(1)} = 1$ and $w_I^{(1)} = 1$. Finally, we need to verify the initial conjecture. Using (D.20) (with $w_I^{(1)} = 1$),

$$\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} > \frac{\gamma\phi_I\sigma_I^2}{M} \lambda_I(s_1^{(1)}) \iff \zeta > \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{M + (1 - \phi_I + \phi_I^3)\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2}{M + (1 - \phi_I)\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2}.$$

Summary: As seen above, in either case, $\alpha^{(1)} = 1$ (and, hence, $w_I^{(1)} = 1$). Define

$$\tau^{(1)} := \zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{M + (1 - \phi_I + \phi_I^3)\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2}{M + (1 - \phi_I)\gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2}.$$

Then, combining (D.17) and (D.20), we obtain the equilibrium on-exchange half spread as

$$s_1^{(1)} = \begin{cases} \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{(1 - \phi_I^2)(M + \gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2)(M + 2\zeta\omega_I\sigma_I^2) + (2(\phi_I + \phi_I^2)\zeta - \phi_I\gamma)M\omega_I\sigma_I^2}{(M + \gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2)^2 - \phi_I^2\gamma^2\omega_I^2\sigma_I^4} & \text{if } \tau^{(1)} > 0; \\ \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{(1 - \phi_I^2)M + 2\omega_I\sigma_I^2\zeta}{M + \gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2} & \text{if } \tau^{(1)} \leq 0. \end{cases} \quad (\text{D.21})$$

Combining (D.15) and (D.18), then plugging in (D.21), we obtain an individual market maker m 's on-exchange equilibrium liquidity supply as

$$x_{m1}^{(1)} = \begin{cases} \frac{\left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2)\right)M\omega_I + \left((1 - \phi_I)\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I - \phi_I^2)\right)\gamma\omega_I^2\sigma_I^2}{(M + \gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2)^2 - \phi_I^2\gamma^2\omega_I^2\sigma_I^4} & \text{if } \tau^{(1)} > 0; \\ \frac{\left(\zeta - \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2)\right)\omega_I}{M + \gamma\omega_I\sigma_I^2} & \text{if } \tau^{(1)} \leq 0. \end{cases} \quad (\text{D.22})$$

Combining (D.16) and (D.19), we obtain the equilibrium off-exchange half spread as

$$s_2^{(1)} = \frac{\gamma}{2}(1 - \phi_I^2). \quad (\text{D.23})$$

Using (D.23), by market clearing, we obtain the equilibrium aggregate off-exchange liquidity supply

$$\int_0^M x_{m2}^{(1)} dm = \left(\zeta - (1 - \phi_I^2) \frac{\gamma}{2} \right) \omega_R. \quad \square \quad (\text{D.24})$$

References

- Adams, S., Kasten, C., 2021. Retail order execution quality under zero commissions. Working paper.
- Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., 1980. Dealership markets: market making with inventory. *J. Financ. Econ.* 8, 31–53.
- Babus, A., Parlato, C., 2022. Strategic fragmented markets. *J. Financ. Econ.* 145, 876–908.
- Baldauf, M., Mollner, J., 2020. Trading in fragmented markets. *J. Financ. Quant. Anal.* 56, 93–121.
- Barardehi, Y.H., Bernhardt, D., Da, Z., Warachka, M., 2024. Uncovering the liquidity premium in stock returns using sub-penny trade executions. Working paper.
- Barber, B.M., Huang, X., Odean, T., Schwarz, C., 2022. Attention-induced trading and returns: evidence from Robinhood users. *J. Finance* 77, 3141–3190.
- Barbon, A., Di Maggio, M., Franzoni, F., Landier, A., 2019. Brokers and order flow leakage: evidence from fire sales. *J. Finance* 74, 2707–2749.
- Barron's, 2021. SEC chairman says banning payment for order flow is 'on the table'. <https://bit.ly/3VfCS6>.
- Battalio, R., Greene, J., Jennings, R., 1997. Do competing specialists and preferencing dealers affect market quality? *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 10, 969–993.
- Battalio, R., Holden, C.W., 2001. A simple model of payment for order flow, internalization, and total trading cost. *J. Financ. Mark.* 4, 33–71.
- Battalio, R.H., 1997. Third market broker-dealers: cost competitors or cream skimmers? *J. Finance* 52, 341–352.
- Ben-Rephael, A., Kandel, S., Wohl, A., 2011. The price pressure of aggregate mutual fund flows. *J. Financ. Quant. Anal.* 46, 585–603.
- Ben-Rephael, A., Kandel, S., Wohl, A., 2012. Measuring investor sentiment with mutual fund flows. *J. Financ. Econ.* 104, 363–382.
- Bernhardt, D., Dvoracek, V., Hughson, E., Werner, I.M., 2004. Why do larger orders receive discounts on the London Stock Exchange? *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 18, 1343–1368.
- Bloomberg, 2022. Retail trading army is seeing power wane in stock market it once ruled. <https://bloom.bg/3O4OmBs>.
- Boehmer, E., Jones, C.M., Zhang, X., Zhang, X., 2021. Tracking retail investor activity. *J. Finance* 76, 2249–2305.
- Brogaard, J., Garriott, C., 2019. High-frequency trading competition. *J. Financ. Quant. Anal.* 54, 1469–1497.
- Bruche, M., Kuong, J.C., 2021. Dealer funding and market liquidity. Working paper.
- Cespa, G., Vives, X., 2022. Exchange competition, entry, and welfare. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 35, 2570–2624.
- Chao, Y., Yao, C., Ye, M., 2019. Why discrete price fragments U.S. stock exchanges and disperses their fee structures. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 32, 1068–1101.
- Chen, D., Duffie, D., 2021. Market fragmentation. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 111, 2247–2274.
- Chordia, T., Subrahmanyam, A., 1995. Market making, the tick size, and payment-for-order flow: theory and evidence. *J. Bus.* 68, 543–575.
- Chowdhry, B., Nanda, V., 1991. Multimarket trading and market liquidity. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 4, 483–511.
- Comerton-Forde, C., Malinova, K., Park, A., 2018. Regulating dark trading: order flow segmentation and market quality. *J. Financ. Econ.* 130, 347–366.
- Corts, K.S., 1998. Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly: all-out competition and strategic commitment. *Rand J. Econ.* 29, 306–323.
- Coval, J., Stafford, E., 2007. Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets. *J. Financ. Econ.* 86, 479–512.
- Daures-Lescourret, L., Moins, S., 2023. Fragmentation and strategic market-making. *J. Financ. Quant. Anal.* 58, 1675–1700.
- Degryse, H., de Jong, F., Kervel, V., 2015. The impact of dark trading and visible fragmentation on market quality. *Rev. Finance* 19, 1587–1622.
- Desgranges, G., Foucault, T., 2005. Reputation-based pricing and price improvements. *J. Econ. Bus.* 57, 493–527.
- Duffie, D., Qiao, L., Sun, Y., 2023. Continuous-time random matching. Working paper.
- Easley, D., Kiefer, N.M., O'Hara, M., 1996. Cream-skimming or profit-sharing? The curious role of purchased order flow. *J. Finance* 51, 811–833.
- Eaton, G.W., Green, T.C., Roseman, B.S., Wu, Y., 2022. Retail trader sophistication and stock market quality: evidence from brokerage outages. *J. Financ. Econ.* 146, 502–528.
- Elsas, R., Johanning, L., Theissen, E., 2022. Payment for order flow and market quality: a field experiment. Working paper.
- Ernst, T., Spatt, C., 2022. Payment for order flow and asset choice. Working paper.
- ESMA, 2021. ESMA warns firms and investors about risks arising from payment for order flow. <https://bit.ly/3XihWrA>.
- Financial Times, 2021. Citadel Securities founder 'quite fine' with ending payment for order flow. <https://on.ft.com/3OxLj3y>.
- Foucault, T., Menkveld, A.J., 2008. Competition for order flow and smart order routing systems. *J. Finance* 63, 119–158.
- Garriott, C., Walton, A., 2018. Retail order flow segmentation. *J. Trading* 13, 13–23.
- Gensler, G., 2022. SEC's meme stock response coming next week, Gensler says. <https://bloom.bg/3UKA7EK>.
- Glode, V., Opp, C., 2016. Asymmetric information and intermediation chains. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 106, 2699–2721.
- Glosten, L.R., Milgrom, P.R., 1985. Bid, ask, and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed agents. *J. Financ. Econ.* 42, 71–100.
- Greenwood, R., 2005. Short- and long-term demand curves for stocks: theory and evidence on the dynamics of arbitrage. *J. Financ. Econ.* 75, 607–649.
- Griffin, K., 2021. Testimony of Kenneth C. Griffin, founder and CEO of Citadel and founder and principal shareholder of Citadel Securities, before the Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives. Report.
- Grossman, S.J., Miller, M.H., 1988. Liquidity and market structure. *J. Finance* 43, 617–633.
- Hagerty, K., McDonald, R.L., 1996. Brokerage, market fragmentation, and securities market regulation. In: *The Industrial Organization and Regulation of the Securities Industry*. University of Chicago Press, pp. 35–62.
- Harris, L., Gurel, E., 1986. Price and volume effects associated with changes in the S&P 500 list: new evidence for the existence of price pressures. *J. Finance* 41, 815–829.
- Hatheway, F., Kwan, A., Zheng, H., 2017. An empirical analysis of market segmentation on U.S. equity markets. *J. Financ. Quant. Anal.* 52, 2399–2427.
- Hendershott, T., Mendelson, H., 2000. Crossing networks and dealer markets: competition and performance. *J. Finance* 55, 2071–2115.
- Hendershott, T., Menkveld, A.J., 2014. Price pressures. *J. Financ. Econ.* 114, 405–423.
- Hendershott, T., Menkveld, A.J., Praz, R., Seasholes, M., 2022. Asset price dynamics with limited attention. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 35, 962–1008.
- Ho, T., Stoll, H.R., 1981. Optimal dealer pricing under transaction cost and return uncertainty. *J. Financ. Econ.* 9, 47–73.
- Ho, T., Stoll, H.R., 1983. The dynamics of dealer markets under competition. *J. Finance* 38, 1053–1074.
- Holmes, T.J., 1989. The effects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 79, 244–250.
- Hu, E., Murphy, D., 2022. Competition for retail order flow and market quality. Working paper.
- Jain, P.K., Suchsmita, Mishra, O'Donoghue, S., 2023. Trading volume shares and market quality: Pre- and post-zero commissions. Working paper.
- Jones, C.M., Shi, D., Zhang, X., Zhang, X., 2023. Retail trading and return predictability in China. *J. Financ. Quant. Anal.* <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109024000085>. Forthcoming.
- Kandel, E., Marx, L.M., 1999. Payments for order flow on Nasdaq. *J. Finance* 54, 35–66.
- Kaniel, R., Saar, G., Titman, S., 2008. Individual investor trading and stock returns. *J. Finance* 63, 273–310.
- Kervel, V., 2015. Competition for order flow with fast and slow traders. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 28, 2094–2127.
- Kyle, A.S., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. *Econometrica* 53, 1315–1336.
- Kyle, A.S., Obizhaeva, A., 2016. Market microstructure invariance: empirical hypotheses. *Econometrica* 84, 1345–1404.
- Linnainmaa, J.T., 2010. Do limit orders alter inferences about investor performance and behavior? *J. Finance* 65, 1473–1506.
- Lo, A.W., Mamaysky, H., Wang, J., 2004. Asset prices and trading volume under fixed transaction costs. *J. Polit. Econ.* 112, 1054–1090.
- Mackintosh, P., 2022. Retail activity remains strong in U.S. markets. *Trad. Mag.* <https://bit.ly/3YQXk9k>.
- Menkveld, A.J., Yueshen, B.Z., Zhu, H., 2017. Shades of darkness: a pecking order of trading venues. *J. Financ. Econ.* 124, 503–534.
- Nimalendran, M., Ray, S., 2014. Informational linkages between dark and lit trading venues. *J. Financ. Mark.* 17, 230–261.
- Pagano, M., 1989. Trading volume and asset liquidity. *Q. J. Econ.* 104, 255–274.
- Pagnotta, E., Philippon, T., 2018. Competing on speed. *Econometrica* 86, 1067–1115.
- Parlour, C., Rajan, U., 2003. Payment for order flow. *J. Financ. Econ.* 68, 379–411.
- Reuters, 2023. EU agrees deals on securities rules that includes ban on broker commission. <https://reut.rs/42py4uf>.
- Schwarz, C., Barber, B.M., Huang, X., Jorion, P., Odean, T., 2023. The 'actual retail price' of equity trades. Working paper.
- SEC, 2021. Staff report on equity and options market structure conditions in early 2021. Report. <https://www.sec.gov/files/staff-report-equity-options-market-structure-conditions-early-2021.pdf>.
- SEC, 2022. Order competition rule (proposed, release no. 34-96495). <https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/34-96495.pdf>.
- Stole, L.A., 2007. Price discrimination and competition. In: *Armstrong, M., Porter, R. (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization*, vol. 3. Elsevier, pp. 2221–2299. Chapter 34.
- Stoll, H.R., 1978. The supply of dealer services in securities markets. *J. Finance* 33, 1133–1151.
- Yang, L., Zhu, H., 2020. Back-running: seeking and hiding fundamental information in order flows. *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 33, 1484–1533.
- Ye, M., Zhu, W., 2020. Strategic informed trading and dark pools. Working paper.
- Zhu, H., 2014. Do dark pools harm price discovery? *Rev. Financ. Stud.* 27, 747–789.